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ARTICLE
Export of Hazardous Waste and Hazardous





The hard questions concerning industrial safety raised by the Seveso
accident in 1976, the disaster in Bhopal, India, in 1984, and the
Chernobyl catastrophe in the spring of 1986, were again pushed to the
forefront of public attention in the wake of the Basel fire and chemical
spill into the Rhine River in November 1986. The heightened interest and
awareness in safety is reflected in Europe, the United States, and the So-
viet Union. The subject is of special concern to developing countries
which rely upon imported industrial technology to enhance the pace of
their economic development.
Notwithstanding recent attempts to address situations involving the
import or export of hazardous technology, there still remain unanswered
questions. The world community has yet to undertake adequate measures
to meet this formidable challenge.
The issue of dumping of hazardous wastes is of even more immediate
concern to developing countries. Increased public consciousness of the en-
vironment in the developed countries led to the passage of stricter legisla-
tion with regard to disposal of hazardous wastes. As a result, producers of
these wastes have sought cheaper alternatives to domestic disposal and
turned to developing nations as disposal sites. A combination of misinfor-
mation and the need for foreign currency has enticed many nations to
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chapter by the authors that will appear in a forthcoming book entitled THE TRANSFER OF
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES AND TECHNOLOGY: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CHALLENGE, edited by
Professors Guenther Handl and Robert Lutz.
** Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies
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accept such wastes. However, developing nations are reconsidering these
policies as a result of public pressures in the developing nations and in-
ternational public opinion. Additionally, efforts to remove already
dumped wastes raise liability questions. Thus, in some ways, the dumping
of hazardous wastes involves similar issues to the export of hazardous
technologies. This is particularly true when the transfer is from a devel-
oped country to a developing country.
This article will explore the considerations that must be taken into
account in any international efforts to address the problem. Although the
focus in this article is on the export of hazardous technologies, related
issues involved in the export of hazardous wastes will also be addressed.
II. THE PROBLEM OF WASTE DUMPING
The current revelations of waste dumping in Africa are distinct from
the disasters in Bhopal, Seveso, Chernobyl, and Basel: as of yet, massive
environmental damage and loss of life have been avoided (though injuries
have been reported by some workers who have come into contact with the
substances).1 However, these incidents are worth noting because they
serve as a stimulus to international action to avert potential disasters.
Between September 1987 and May 1988, several ships unloaded
cargo from Italy in the small port of Koko, Nigeria. The cargo consisted
of hazardous waste packed in steel drums, some of which was reported to
be poisonous PCBs and highly radioactive materials.2 The cargo was
"stored" in a vacant lot in a residential area of Koko for approximately
$100 a month.3 Until June, the presence of these materials was unde-
tected by Nigerian newspapers, although it had been reported in the Ital-
ian press in March. In June of 1988, reports began appearing in the
Nigerian media."
When the presence of the material became publicized, the Nigerian
government reacted by jailing one of the Italian partners responsible for
importing the waste and demanding that the waste be removed.' The
Italian government sent experts to Koko and arranged to have the waste
removed. The Italian government planned to bill the cost to companies
that exported the waste from Italy.'
The Karin B., a West German ship, left Koko at the end of July
carrying the toxic waste. Protestors prevented the ship from docking in
Ravenna, Italy, the source of the alleged exportation. The ship subse-
1. Brooke, Waste Dumpers Turning to West Africa, N.Y. Times, July 17, 1988, at 1,
col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Waste Dumpers].
2. Id.; Italy Recalls 'Karen B.', Introduces Remedial Steps, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
469 (Sept. 14, 1988) [hereinafter cited as Italy Recalls 'Karin B.'].
3. Waste Dumpers, supra note 1, at 7, col. 1.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Italy Recalls 'Karin B.', supra note 2, at 469-70.
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quently was denied permission to dock in Spain, France, the Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom. Finally in mid-September, the Italian govern-
ment reportedly arranged for the ship to dock at an unspecified Italian
port in mid-September.7
The incident at Koko was not unique. In March 1988, a Norwegian
company dumped hazardous waste on a Guinean resort island. When
tourists noticed the withering vegetation, it was discovered that the mate-
rial was incinerator ash from the United States.' The government of
Guinea imprisoned Norway's Honorary Consul, but the Norwegian com-
pany removed the waste by July."
American and European companies also reportedly sought to dispose
of hazardous waste by contract with African governments. In several in-
stances, African leaders repudiated these existing contracts when the con-
tracts became public.10 In some cases, the contracts failed to specify or
misrepresented the nature of the waste, while others reportedly contained
kickbacks to government officials who approved the contracts. The exis-
tence of the contracts became a political issue in most reported cases.11
The recent awareness of these incidents produced strong reactions
not only in developing nations, but also in developed nations and relevant
international agencies. Both Nigeria and Guinea have imprisoned individ-
uals who were determined to have "masterminded" the illegal importa-
tion of the wastes. 2 Nigeria even prescribes execution for individuals con-
victed of illegally importing hazardous waste."3 Other nations have
enacted fines, lengthy imprisonment, and the assessment of removal costs
upon individuals convicted of dumping toxic wastes. 4
Among developed nations, Italy, in September 1988, was considering
a decree that would place an embargo on all exports of hazardous wastes
to developing countries. 5 The United States Environmental Protection
Agency currently enforces a policy of "prior informed consent" and is re-
portedly seeking approval of a policy allowing the agency to prohibit ex-
ports when "they might present a serious risk of harm to the importing
7. Id.
8. Waste Dumpers, supra note 1; Shabecoff, Irate and Afraid, Poor Nations Fight Ef-
forts to Use Them as Toxic Dumps, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1988, at A22, col. 4 [hereinafter
cited as Irate and Afraid].
9. Irate and Afraid, id. at A22, col. 4.
10. Brooke, African Nations Barring Toxic Waste, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, at AS,
col. 1 [hereinafter cited as African Nations Barring Toxic Waste].
11. Id.
12. Waste Dumpers, supra note 1.
13. Id.; Irate and Afraid, supra note 8; African Nations Barring Toxic Waste, supra
note 10.
14. Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Ghana are all reported to have
enacted some type of legislation upon the issue. See African Nations Barring Toxic Waste,
supra note 10.
15. Italy Recalls 'Karin B.', supra note 2, at 470-71.
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country." 16 A bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the importing
country may be required as evidence of consent. 17 Other developed na-
tions also are reassessing their export policies concerning hazardous
waste.
International organizations also are active in the area. In June 1988,
the Organization of African Unity condemned the dumping of waste ma-
terial in Africa as "a crime against Africa and African people."' 8 The Eu-
ropean Community ("E.C."), is considering a resolution to implement EC
Directive 86/279, calling for prior informed consent and proof of capacity
to handle the waste in a safe way by the importing country before export
is permitted. 9 In March, 1989, a proposed conference is set for the sign-
ing of a convention regulating the shipment of hazardous waste.2" While
work on this convention began before the most recent revelations of
dumping of waste in Africa, UNEP has reported increased interest in the
convention during the course of 1988." In September 1988, the Interna-
tional Maritime Bureau established a "hotline" to compile information on
unregulated dumping of hazardous waste.2 It is hoped that such a hotline
will enable shipowners to examine the background of agents who present
potentially hazardous cargo which may be rejected at the destination
port."3
All of these actions indicate a new awareness of the problems posed
by hazardous waste disposal, particularly when the wastes are exported to
developing countries which may lack the technology to adequately handle
dangerous materials.
III. TRANSNATIONAL RESPONSES TO WASTE DUMPING
Principle 21 of the 1972 Declaration of the United Nations Confer-
ence on the Human Environment is relevant to the issue of export of
hazardous wastes. This principle imposes responsibility on states to en-
sure that activities within their control do not harm the environment of
other nations." Greenpeace calls for a total ban on the export of hazard-
ous waste under this principle." However, there are several factors that
complicate a blanket ban based on this principle.
16. See Irate and Afraid, supra note 8.
17. U.S. Would Tie Waste Exports to Bilateral Agreements, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
472 (Sept. 14, 1988).
18. Irate and Afraid, supra note 8.
19. U.S. Would Tie Wastes Exports to Bilateral Agreements, supra note 17, at 469.
20. Id. at 471-72.
21. Id. at 471.
22. ICC's Maritime [sic] Bureau Establishes Hot Line to Collect Unregulated Waste
Dumping Data, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 473 (Sept. 14, 1988).
23. Id.
24. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 48/14 & Corr. 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
25. Greenpeace Calls for World Ban on International Traffic in Waste, 11 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 433-34 (Aug. 19, 1988).
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First, it is clear that developing countries do not intend to request
such a ban."s Instead, developing countries desire fuller disclosure by the
exporting nations on the nature and hazards of the waste. They also re-
quest transfers of technology to aid in the safe handling of the waste.
2 7
Developing nations also request that transit nations, through which the
waste will pass en route to its destination, should be permitted to pro-
hibit transport of wastes in transit if they deem it unsafe."
Although the need for recourse when the failure to respect estab-
lished international standards is clear, there is no consensus as to the na-
ture of such recourse. In the recent cases of dumping in Africa, the coun-
tries and companies involved resolved the disputes bilaterally and
provided reasonably swift clean-up and removal of the hazardous waste.
Still, the issue of punishment for scofflaw nations and companies re-
mains.2 6 This raises the difficult question of when a state is to be deemed
responsible for the actions of its multinational enterprises. This question
is especially difficult when the waste may be produced in one state and
shipped by a company based in another state aboard a ship owned by a
company in a third state. The complexity increases if the waste is shipped
through intermediate points, especially if this is done to circumvent regu-
lations of the state of production.3"
Harmonization of international standards is another issue. Currently,
at least two U.N. groups, as well as the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development ("OECD"), are considering rules concerning
hazardous wastes.31 Harmonization of standards may simplify the regula-
tory tasks of both exporting and importing nations by standardizing ter-
minology as well as disclosure and handling requirements. In the absence
of international standards, corporations are urged to meet the highest na-
tional standards.3 2 However, if disparate international standards are set,
corporations might be tempted to meet only the minimal requirements of
an international agreement.
State responsibility in related areas may serve as a reference point
with regard to responsibility for export of dangerous technology and haz-
ardous wastes. 3 In The Corfu Channel Case,3 4 the International Court of
26. Supra note 17, at 471.
27. Id. Developing nations probably would not favor the idea of a supranational police
force to regulate hazardous waste, as this would be seen as an invasion of their sovereignty.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. This issue may be addressed by UNEP conferences in November 1988 and
March 1989.
30. Fears of such circumvention have deterred the European Community from insisting
on a total ban of hazardous waste exports. Id. at 469.
31. The U.N. Committee on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and UNEP are re-
ported to be coordinating their work. Id. at 492.
32. Id. at 493-94.
33. In this sense, responsibility can be said to be generally equivalent to liability. For
discussion of state responsibility, see infra notes 340-364 and accompanying text.
34. [U.K. v. Albania] 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of April 9).
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Justice affirmed the principle that a state is responsible, under customary
international law, for conditions of which it knows, or should know,
within its territory, that cause harm to another state. The state must
know that such a danger exists,s5 but with respect to export of dangerous
technology or hazardous waste, the danger is obvious. If the danger can
be treated safely with appropriate methods and technology, and the harm
is caused by dereliction of these standards in the importing state, a differ-
ent situation arises. However, if the exporting state knew that the receiv-
ing state lacked adequate facilities and technology, fault would lie with
the exporting state.3
The recent trend seems to be for developed countries to "assure
themselves" that appropriate safeguards exist, at least with respect to
disposal of hazardous waste. This solution is not satisfactory to develop-
ing nations, which may resent such judgments as infringements upon
their sovereignty.
A system under which developing countries are fully informed of the
risks associated with dangerous technologies/wastes and the importation
of appropriate technologies to safeguard against such risks might be more
acceptable. While importation of protective technology may indeed incur
added expenses, the developing nations could decide for themselves if
they should incur such expenses. The intensified awareness of the public
to such dangers in both importing and exporting nations also could act as
an additional constraint on reckless transfers of dangerous wastes or
technologies.
The International Law Commission, in its study on the law of the
non-navigational uses of international watercourses, proposed an analo-
gous solution. The provisional articles provide for "equitable and reasona-
ble utilization" of watercourses as well as for exchanges of information on
the condition of the watercourse (including future plans which may have
an effect on the watercourse)." Relating such a system to export of haz-
ardous waste or technologies, an exporting nation could be required to
disclose information on the nature and dangers of the waste, as well as to
act in a "reasonable" manner. This might include sending technicians to
check on the storage techniques as well as providing access to technolo-
gies for safely disposing of the waste or employing the hazardous
technology.
A recent OECD proposal for its Code of Good Practice suggests that
informed consent and cooperation between neighboring nations is an ef-
fective way of dealing with the export of hazardous technologies. The
group recommends the development of emergency preparedness proce-
35. Id. at 18.
36. This is not to say that some liability would not also arise to the importing state for
allowing importation of such technology or waste.
37. See International Law Commission Takes Key Steps Toward Watercourses Pact,
11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 468-69 (Sept. 14, 1988).
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dures and response plans. However, the group reached no conclusion on
the issues of liability or sanctions against nations which do not comply
with the proposed Code."
IV. FACTUAL SETTINGS OF THE RECENT MAJOR ACCIDENTS RELATED TO
THE EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGY
A. Seveso, Italy
On July 10, 1976, an explosion occurred in Meda, Italy at the Icmesa
plant owned by Givaudan, a subsidiary of the Swiss-controlled Hoffmann-
LaRoche chemical combine. A thick whitish cloud of trichlorophenol gas
with a pungent, medicinal odor containing approximately four and one-
half pounds of the substance 2, 3, 7, 8 dibenzo-paradioxin, know as
TCDD or dioxin, was released into the atmosphere surrounding the plant.
A northerly wind moved the cloud to the south over an area some four
and one-half miles long and a third of a mile wide before dispersing a half
an hour after the initial release." The cloud eventually dispersed as drop-
lets over parts of seven towns. The three most affected towns were Meda,
Seveso, and Cesano Maderno.
The Icmesa plant, located about thirteen miles north of Milan, pro-
duced mainly trichlorophenol gas, a chemical used primarily to make
hexachlorophene, an ingredient in cleansers and germicides, and 2-4-5, a
defoliant employed by the American armed forces during the Viet Nam
War.40 On July 10, 1976, for an unknown reason, temperatures within the
plant's system rose, causing pressure to build up. Production at the plant
usually took place at a temperature of 180 degrees centigrade, while tem-
peratures of 230 degrees centigrade caused the process to go out of con-
trol. 1 On that Saturday in 1976, the temperature in the system rose to
300 degrees centigrade, even though the controls were set for cooling. As a
consequence of the pressure build-up, a safety valve burst, and the cloud
of trichlorophenol gas was released into the atmosphere.
4 2
The head of Givaudan, Guy Waldvogel, stated that the plant had two
cooling plants built into its security systems, although these may not have
been put into action soon enough.' As in Bhopal, the Icmesa plant was
the subject of safety complaints prior to the accident. These complaints
included assertions by plant workers that security measures for handling
toxic substances were inadequate and that the plant lacked a dump tank
38. Hazardous Installation Measures Adopted by the OECED Member Countries, 11
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 465 (Sept. 14, 1988).
39. Davis, Under the Poison Cloud, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 10, 1976, at 20, col. 1 [here-
inafter cited as Poison Cloud].
40. Poison Cloud's Effects Still Baffle Italy's Officials, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1978, at 3,
col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Still Baffle].
41. Poison Cloud, supra note 39.
42. Still Baffle, supra note 40.
43. Poison Cloud, supra note 39.
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or vapor recovery system."" This latter defect meant that, once the safety
valve burst, the vapors were released directly into the atmosphere.' 5 A
medical survey of workers at the plant also indicated many that had suf-
fered from nausea and vomiting, burns, blisters, intoxication and
vertigo.46
The Icmesa plant also exhibited the Bhopal pattern of company
management failing to inform local authorities of the type of products
being generated during the chemical production processes, the exact na-
ture of the production processes, and the plant's high-risk potential. Ini-
tially, plant officials kept quiet about the release, hoping that rain would
wash away the pollution. Finally, they informed local authorities twenty-
seven hours after the explosion took place.4 7 It then took the plant man-
agers seven days to inform local authorities that dioxins were present in
the released vapor cloud.'8 This delay occurred in spite of the fact that it
involved a substance of which three ounces could injure or kill most of
New York City's population." Local authorities magnified these delay er-
rors by taking five days to place some of the areas contaminated by the
dioxin off-limits to workers and residents. In addition, the superhighway
through the area remained open, and clean-up crews wore their contami-
nated protective clothing into non-contaminated neighboring areas.5
Once the magnitude and nature of the accident were realized by the
local authorities, three zones were established around the plant with the
most contaminated area designated as Zone A. This zone, which initially
encompassed about 285 acres,5" was sealed off, and the 730 inhabitants
were evacuated.52 The 175 children of the residents living in this zone
were sent to state-subsidized summer camps. All agricultural, industrial,
and commercial activity in Zone A was halted, including the sale and con-
sumption of locally produced foodstuffs.5 3 Zone B, which included about
451 acres, was classified as slightly polluted, and the 4,280 residents were
allowed to remain at home, although they were urged to send their chil-
dren away and pregnant women were asked to submit to medical exami-
nations. A larger area, Zone C, was designated as a safeguard zone where
the residents were advised not to eat produce grown in the area.
The accident's immediate human medical effects were primarily in
the form of more than 500 cases of chloracne and other forms of skin
disease. Some of these cases persisted for more than two years after the
44. Id.; Still Baffle, supra note 40.
45. Graham, How Are We Fixed For Toxic Clouds?, 79 AUDUBON 137, 138 (1977).
46. Poison Cloud, supra note 39.
47. Commission Reports on Causes of Seveso, Makes General Suggestions for New
Rules, 1 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 246 (Aug. 10, 1978).
48. Id.; Poison Cloud, supra note 39.
49. Poison Cloud, supra note 39.
50. Harnik, The Lessons of Seveso, 64 SIERRA 77 (1979).
51. Still Baffle, supra note 40.
52. Poison Cloud, supra note 39.
53. Id.
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time of the accident. 4 The most severe biological impact was the loss of
produce and domestic animals raised in the contaminated zones, which
either died or were destroyed.
The indirect long-term effects of the accident went beyond the physi-
cal impacts upon the inhabitants of the three zones. Immediately follow-
ing the accident, orders for furniture and clothes sold by local merchants
were either cancelled or large discounts were demanded. 5 The plant itself
was permanently closed a little more than a month after the accident."
Many families and businesses were disrupted as a consequence of the
forced evacuation and relocation of residents of the contaminated area.
Houses in the most contaminated areas were demolished, while structures
left standing had to be decontaminated. Initially, the Italian government
allocated $48.4 million to carry out these measures, with most of that
money earmarked for decontamination and health projects for affected
residents. 7
The magnitude of the problem is demonstrated by the fact that offi-
cials were not sure how to clean up the affected area for months after the
accident. Demonstrations by former residents occurred, protesting the
slow pace of the government's decontamination program.58 The basic rec-
lamation plan finally approved by the regional government provided that
all vegetation and soil to a depth of one foot from the directly affected
areas were to be removed and incinerated at 1,000 degrees centigrade.59
Once an area had been sufficiently decontaminated to allow human activ-
ity again, a research and experimental laboratory to study techniques for
neutralizing or reducing the effects of dioxin was constructed. Nearly
three years after the accident, data supplied by the laboratory indicated
that there was no sign that the toxicity of remaining dioxin-contaminated
areas was diminishing.
60
By the time the decontamination efforts had been largely completed,
more than two tons of chemical waste containing dioxin had been re-
moved from the total of 4,400 acres of land which had been contaminated
by the Icmesa plant.6 Even the disposal of this waste was not without
mishap, as the 41 drums containing the waste disappeared during their
transport out of Italy. The drums were eventually located in a storehouse
54. Hoffman-Larouche Chairman Sees End to Threat from Pollution at Seveso, 1 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 211 (July 10, 1978).
55. Town in Italy's Toxic Area Misses Children It Sent Away, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17,
1976, at 6, col. 4; Poison Cloud, supra note 39.
56. Polluting Factory in Italy Will Close, N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1976, at 6, col. 3.
57. Italy Allocates Funds For Gassed Region, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1976, at 2, col. 4.
58. Italians Stage Protest at Contaminated Town, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1976, at 7, col.
1; Poison Cloud, supra note 39.
59. Seveso Disaster, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1976, at 34, col. 1; Poison Cloud, supra note
39.
60. 2 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 611 (April 11, 1979).
61. Hoffman-LaRouche Says Dioxin from Seveso Entirely Removed for Disposal
Outside Italy, 5 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 485 (Nov. 10, 1982).
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in northern France after considerable public furor.2 Finally, more than
six years after the accident, the Italian government oversaw the disman-
tling of the Icmesa reactor and the burial of the remaining rubble from
the reactor in lead barrels in a 160,000-cubic-meter ditch situated in a
corner of the once-highly contaminated sector.63 A committee of indepen-
dent scientists reported that, eight years after the accident, no chemical
traces of the explosion were visible, except for occasional continuing cases
of chloracne. The committee reported that Hoffmann-LaRoche was plan-
ning to landscape the affected area into a 40-hectare park."
Hoffmann-Laroche indicated fairly early on that it intended to ac-
cept responsibility for the consequences of the explosion and to compen-
sate those damaged by the accident, perhaps partly as a result of the find-
ings of a special parliamentary investigating commission set up by the
Italian government. The commission's report, issued one year after the
accident, accused the Hoffmann-LaRoche subsidiary, Givaudan, of not
only failing to inform the local and regional Italian authorities about the
nature of the Icmesa operations, but also of failing to install automatic
control and warning devices. 5
The Italian government and the Lombardy region reached a settle-
ment with Givaudan with regard to compensation for the Seveso accident.
Givaudan agreed to pay the governments a total of $80 million for ex-
penses incurred by various Italian ministries, land reclamation, health
work, rebuilding in the area, lost crops, and decontamination.6
The commune of Seveso filed suit in Geneva, Switzerland against
Givaudan in early 1979 for damages to the community and its inhabi-
tants. The suit accused Givaudan of failing to take adequate safety pre-
cautions, failing to correct those inadequacies after becoming aware of
them, and attempting a cover up after the explosion. 7 Seveso and
Givaudan reached a settlement of the suit in late 1983 when Givaudan
agreed to pay about $7.2 million to Seveso for damages.6
Five Icmesa executives, including the plant's managing director,
technical director, plant designer, company chairman, and plant engineer,
were brought to trial as a result of the Seveso explosion. The five were
charged with negligence leading to a disaster, causing contamination of a
62. Dioxin Wastes Still Missing in Europe, Pressure Mounts for Controls on Ship-
ments, 6 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 194 (May 11, 1983).
63. Remnants of Icmesa Reactor Demolished, Closing Book on Seveso Explosion,
Cleanup, 7 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 38 (Feb. 8, 1984).
64. Id. at 220.
65. Commission Reports on Causes of Seveso, Makes General Suggestions for New
Rules, 1 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 246 (Aug. 10, 1978).
66. Figures for Seveso Compensation at Odds with Italian Announcement, 3 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 242 (June 11, 1980).
67. Seveso Files Suit in Geneva Court Seeking Damages for Dioxin Disaster, 2 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 574 (Mar. 10, 1979).
68. Italian Court Sentences Icmesa Officials for Roles in Explosion at Plant in Seveso,
6 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 454 (Oct. 12, 1983).
VOL. 17:1
EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE AND TECHNOLOGY
vast inhabited area that had to be evacuated, and failure to have ade-
quate safety systems.6 9 The Italian court found the five guilty and as-
sessed sentences ranging from two and one-half to five years in prison.
70
Four of the convictions were overturned on appeal, while the fifth sen-
tence was suspended.1 Charges against the mayor of Meda and local
health officials were initially filed and then later dropped. The charges
were based upon the officials' failure to apply existing legislation which
could have avoided the disaster.
Two and one-half years after the Seveso accident, Italy, which had
virtually no environmental legislation in force during 1976, enacted legis-
lation which reformed its national health care system. Provisions within
the new law which had a bearing on environmental hazards caused by
harmful substances included standards for the production, registration,
sale, and use of chemical substances capable of upsetting the biological
and ecological balance; the establishment and maintenance of a national
inventory of chemical substances; and the creation of "risk maps" based
on a requirement that all factories provide data on the toxicological char-




On the night of December 2-3, 1984, toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC)
gas escaped from an underground storage tank at a Union Carbide chemi-
cal manufacturing plant in Bhopal, India and leaked into the atmo-
sphere.73 The gas covered an area of 25 square miles and resulted in an
69. Still Baffle, supra note 40; Dioxin Waste Still Missing in Europe, supra note 62 at
196.
70. Supra note 68.
71. See Revzin, Seveso: Ten Years After the Dioxin Leak, Wall St. J., July 8, 1986, at
36, col. 1.
72. 2 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 506 (Feb. 10, 1979).
73. See, e.g., The Implications of the Industrial Disaster in Bhopal, India, Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 12, 1984, at 3, 6 (statement of Robert A. Peck, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State), and at
28 (statement of Ronald Wishart, Vice President for government relations, Union Carbide
Corp.); Hazardous Air Pollutants, Hearing before the House Subcommittee on Health and
the Environment of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Dec. 14,
1984, at 8 (statement of Warren M. Anderson, CEO of Union Carbide Corp.); Release of
Poison Gases and Other Hazardous Air Pollutants from Chemical Plants, Joint Hearing
before the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment and the Subcommittee on
Commerce, Transportation and Tourism of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., March 26, 1985, at 198, 205 (statements by Warren M. Anderson and Jack-
son B. Browning, President and Vice President for Health, Safety and Environmental Af-
fairs of Union Carbide Corp. respectively regarding possible causes of accident); Bhopal -
What Really Happened?, Bus. WK. (New Delhi), Feb. 25 - March 10, 1982, at 102; Bhopal:
City of Death, India Today, Dec. 31, 1984, at 6; Hazarika, Gas Leak in India Kills at Least
410 in City of Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1984, at Al, col. 6; Diamond, The Bhopal Disas-
ter: How It Happened, N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
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unparalleled catastrophe, causing the death of over 1,600 people and in-
juring over 200,000 people as a direct result of the leak; several hundred
more died in the next few months due to the fatal effects of the lethal
gas. 74 Livestock were killed, crops damaged, and businesses interrupted.
75
In the aftermath of the world's worst industrial accident, medical au-
thorities were uncertain about the long-term effects of exposure to the
deadly gas.76 Two years after the disaster, it was reported that lingering
effects on many Bhopal residents included "shortness of breath, eye irri-
tation, and depression. ' ' 7 The Indian government reported that the death
toll has risen to 2,347 people, that 30,000 to 40,000 people had suffered
serious injuries in the incident,7 8 and that it had received 500,000 leak-
related claims.
79
The accident occurred at the Bhopal plant of Union Carbide India,
Ltd. (UCIL), a subsidiary of the Union Carbide Corp., a New York corpo-
ration with headquarters in Danbury, Connecticut, which owns 50.9% of
its Indian subsidiary. The Indian government blamed Union Carbide for
errors in the design, management, and oversight of the Bhopal plant, and
specifically asserted that "unreasonable and highly dangerous and defec-
tive plant conditions" caused the catastrophe. 0 It cited inadequate safety
measure, faulty alarm systems, storage of huge quantities of toxic chemi-
cals, lack of cooling facilities, and poor maintenance at the factory.8 ' The
company, on the other hand, contended that the responsibility must lie
with its subsidiary along with the state of Madhya Pradesh where the
plant was located and the central government of India; it also alleged sab-
otage by a disgruntled worker at the plant."5
In the Bhopal district court where the case was pending, Union Car-
74. See, e.g., Lewin, Carbide Is Sued in U.S. by India in Gas Disaster, N.Y. Times,
April 9, 1985, at D2, col. 2; Kramer, For Bhopal Survivors, Recovery is Agonizing, Illnesses
are Insidious, Wall St. J., April 1, 1985, at 14, col. 2.
75. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984,
634 F. Supp. 842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
76. See, e.g., Sullivan, Long-Term Effects of Gas Unknown, N.Y. Times, Dec. 6, 1984,
at A10, col. 1; Bishop, Long-Term Effects Aren't Known of Gas That Killed or Hurt
Thousands in India, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1984, at 7, col. 1; Diamond, Lasting Health Damage
Laid to Chemical Leakage in India, N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
77. Miller, Two Years After Bhopal's Gas Disaster, Lingering Effects Still Plague Its
People, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1986, at 30, col. 2.
78. Meier & Miller, India Plans to Seek At Least $3 Billion From Union Carbide for
Bhopal Claims, Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 3, col. 1; Hazarika, India To Seek At Least $3
Billion From Union Carbide For Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at 10, col. 6.
79. Miller, supra note 77, at col. 3.
80. See id.; India Sues Union Carbide in Bhopal; Case Differs Little from One Filed in
U.S., 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 343 (Oct. 8, 1986).
81. India Sues Union Carbide, supra note 80.
82. See Miller, supra note 77; Diamond, Carbide Gives Details on Its Sabotage Claim,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1986, at 29, col. 1; Weisman & Hazarika, Theory of Bhopal Sabotage
Is Offered, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1987, at 6, col. 1. In its response in the Bhopal court to the
Indian government suit against it, Union Carbide said that its subsidiary and the Indian
government had the key roles in operating and overseeing the plant. Id.
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bide contended that, although it owned 50.9% of the stock in its subsidi-
ary, the government of India had barred it from running the plant. In-
stead, it said that "it sold general design drawings to its Indian
subsidiary, which then hired companies to do detailed design and con-
struction. The parent trained some of the plant managers, but was unable
to dictate the plant's daily operations."83 It added that the 1973 agree-
ment for the sale of the design, approved by the Indian government, stip-
ulated that the parent "shall not, in any way be liable for any loss, dam-
age, personal injury, or death" resulting from the use of the design
specifications by the UCIL.84 The company also contended that "the In-
dian government had approved and inspected the plant, knew about the
dangers of MIC, and refused to allow American employees from Carbide
to remain in India to provide technical assistance requested by its subsid-
iary to the Indians running the plant. . . . [T]he state government in
Bhopal had allowed, people to move close to the plant, hence knowing the
dangers they would face in an accident."8 5 Earlier, in a federal district
court in New York, similar charges and countercharges regarding the re-
sponsibility for the design of the plant, overall control, and training of the
personnel were exchanged by the government of India and Union
Carbide."
Questions have been raised about the safety of the plant design in
Bhopal, which went into production in 1980,17 and the adequacy of safety
equipment and operating systems." None of the safety devices worked."
Because of instrumentation errors, monitoring gauges did not work, and
hence there was no early warning of the impending disaster. The mechan-
ical valves which were supposed to act as a backstop measure were dys-
functional. Also, the vent gas scrubber (VGS) intended to neutralize any
leaking gas by automatically "washing" the toxic gas with caustic soap,
thereby rendering it harmless, was shut off when the leak occurred. The
flair tower designed to burn leaking gas had also been shut down. How-
ever, according to one report, "because of faulty design, both the VGS
and flair tower together also could not have prevented the MIC from es-
caping into the atmosphere." 90 As evidence of the faults in the plant de-
sign, it was reported that there was no backup system to prevent this
83. See Diamond, supra note 82.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 29, col. 2.
86. See In re Union Carbide Corp., supra note 75, 634 F. Supp. at 855-59. See also
Adler, Carbide Plays "Hardball", AM. LAW., Nov. 1985, at 27, 58; Discrepancies Are Seen in
Bhopal Court Papers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1986, at D3, col. 2.
87. See Pesticide Plant Started as a Showpiece But Ran Into Troubles, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 3, 1985, at 8, col. 4.
88. On these issues, we have relied extensively on Professor Nanda's remarks at the
April, 1985, meeting of the American Society of International Law. See 1985 PROC. AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 304-310 (1987).
89. See Bhopal - What Really Happened?, supra note 73, at 104-105; Bhopal: City of
Death, supra note 73, at 8-10.
90. Bhopal - What Really Happened?, supra note 73, at 105.
1988
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
kind of gas escape. Safety measures used elsewhere by Union Carbide
were lacking; for example, the UCIL plant lacked the computerized pres-
sure/temperature sensing system, and there were no effective alternatives.
A study of the design analysis of the storage area for MIC led one re-
porter to two conclusions:
First, that the short-sighted design modification made in the pipeline
connections, less than a year ago, along with the dysfunctioning of
some valves, were primarily responsible for water ingress in the MIC
tank. And, second, the original design of the MIC storage area did not
provide even a single, safe route for a toxic gas at a very high temper-
ature and pressure to be neutralized before escaping into the atmo-
sphere. In other words, the safety features were greatly under-
designed. 1
Following the Bhopal disaster, several claims on behalf of the victims
were filed in India as well as in the United States,92 raising questions
about the possible violations of Indian law which prohibits solicitation of
clients and contingency fees. 3 Meanwhile, on February 20, the Indian
government adopted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Ordinance and, on
March 29, 1985, enacted the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of
Claims) Act,94 under which the government of India assumed responsibil-
ity as the sole representative of all the victims of the gas leak to bring a
single action against Union Carbide. Subsequently, in April 1985 the In-
dian government, on behalf of the victims, filed as parens patriae a law-
suit against Union Carbide in the federal district court for the Southern
District of New York, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages
in an unspecified amount. 5 Before filing the suit, which invoked six, sep-
arate theories of liability on the part of Union Carbide - absolute liabil-
ity, strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, and
the multinational enterprise liability theory -- y" the government of India
had rejected a Union Carbide offer to settle the controversy for $200 mil-
lion dollars.9"
Two U.S. lawyers challenged the Indian government's action of filing
a lawsuit on behalf of all the victims by in turn filing a suit in India."
The challenge to block the Indian suit in the United States was based on
91. Id. at 104.
92. See Stevens, U.S. Lawyers Are Arriving To Prepare Big Damage Suits, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 12, 1984, at A10, col. 1; Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened
In India After the Bhopal Tragedy, 20 TEx. INr'L L.J. 273, 290 (1985).
93. See Galanter, supra note 92, at 278, 290.
94. Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Ordinance, No. 1 of 1985, Feb. 20, 1985. The text of the
March 29, 1985 Act, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 884 (1986).
95. See Galanter, supra note 92, at 286; Riley, Bhopal: The Legal Escalation Begins In
Earnest, Nat'l L. J., April 22, 1985, at 8, col. 1; Lewin, Carbide Is Sued In U.S. By India In
Gas Disaster, N.Y. Times, April 9, 1985, at Al, col. 5.
96. See Riley, supra note 95.
97. See Galanter, supra note 92, at 285.
98. See Riley, supra note 95, at 8, col. 3.
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the alleged violations by the Indian government's legislation of the right
of Indian citizens under the Constitution of India to choose their own
counsel and, on the contention that if the Indian government also shared
the responsibility for the disaster by failing to enforce safety regulations,
it could not represent the victims because of a conflict of interest."
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all the
lawsuits brought in the United States in federal district court in the
Southern District of New York.'0 0 A year after the suit was brought, Dis-
trict Judge Keenan dismissed the case on the grounds of forum non con-
veniens under three conditions: one, that Union Carbide consent to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the court of India and continue to waive
defenses based upon the statute of limitations; two, that Union Carbide
agree to satisfy any judgment rendered against it by an Indian court, pro-
vided that the minimal requirements of due process are met; and three,
that Union Carbide comply with U.S. rules on discovery under the federal
rules of civil procedure. 10 1
Earlier efforts at a negotiated settlement were unsuccessful when the
Indian government rejected a Union Carbide offer of $350 million dollars,
which with interest would have accrued to $500-600 million and which
was accepted by lawyers representing private plaintiffs in litigation.'0
Union Carbide appealed the judge's ruling contending that the Indian
government must also be bound by U.S.-style discovery rules. 03 Attor-
neys for the individual plaintiffs in the Bhopal case also appealed the
ruling by Judge Keenan that sent the proceedings to India.1" Subse-
quently, on September 5, 1986, the Indian government sued Union Car-
bide in the Bhopal district court in India for damages arising out of the
gas leak." 5 The Indian government sought at least $3 billion from Union
Carbide Corp. in claims arising from the disaster.'0 0 In January 1987, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the Federal District Court and
held that both Union Carbide and the Indian government must have
equal access to evidence and granted Union Carbide U.S.-style discovery
powers as well.107 At the end of November 1987, all ongoing efforts to
99. See Lewin, supra note 95, at D2, col. 4.
100. See Cates, Hundred Lawyers Start Legal Cleanup, Nat'l L. J., April 29, 1985, at
13, col. 1.
101. In re Union Carbide Corp., supra note 75, at 867.
102. See India Refuses, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 107 (April 9, 1986). The Indian gov-
ernment claims that it represents all victims of the disaster, based on the doctrine of in
parens patriae, and on retainers executed by 487,000. Id. at col. 2.
103. See N.Y. Times, July 11, 1986, at 27, col. 6.
104. See Plaintiffs' Attorneys in Bhopal Case Appeal Transfer of Proceedings to In-
dia, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 313 (Sept. 10, 1986).
105. Supra note 81.
106. See Hazarika, supra note 73; Meier & Miller, supra note 78.
107. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987); Meir, Union Carbide Gets Equal Access to Bhopal Data, Wall
St. J., Jan. 15, 1987, at 16, col. 1; Defries, The Role of Environment in the Development
Process, 11 INT'L Bus. LAW. 52 (1983).
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reach a negotiated settlement between the government of India and
Union Carbide 08 had stalled, 0 9 and the Indian government filed criminal
charges of culpable homicide in Bhopal against Union Carbide.'1
Subsequently, on December 17, 1987, Judge M. W. Deo of the Bhopal
District Court ordered Union Carbide to pay $270 million in interim relief
to the victims of the accident."1 On review, the State high court ruled
that an interim payment of $193 million be paid."' On further appeal,
India's highest court, the Supreme Court of India, urged the Indian gov-
ernment and Union Carbide to settle their protracted legal dispute. 3
The Bhopal tragedy created momentum to seek appropriate interna-
tional, regional, and national action to provide proper export safeguards
for hazardous substances and technologies and effective international as-
sistance in establishing standards and in providing guidance to develop-
ing countries.
C. Chernobyl, U.S.S.R.
On April 26, 1986, a chemical explosion resulting in a meltdown oc-
curred in one of the four reactors of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant
near Kiev in the Soviet Union, causing in the destruction of the core of
the reactor. " The Soviet authorities were slow both in notifying Soviet
citizens likely to be affected by the accident and in revealing the details
of the accident in the graphite-moderated reactor. 1
108. See, e.g., Hazarika, Carbide and India Strive for Bhopal Fund Accord, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1987, at 32, col. 1; id., Nov. 18, 1987, at 31, col. 1.
109. See Wall St. J., Nov. 30, 1987, at 4, col. 1.
110. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1987, at 44, col. 1. On the litigation aspects of the case, see
Nanda, For Whom the Bell Tolls in the Aftermath of the Bhopal Tragedy: Some Reflec-
tions on Forum Non Conveniens and Alternative Methods of Resolving the Bhopal Dis-
pute, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 235 (1987).
111. Indian Judge Orders Union Carbide to Pay, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 13,
1988).
112. Union Carbide Says Bhopal Judge Biased, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 270 (May
11, 1988).
113. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1988, at C2, col. 1. On finding a solution, see Nanda,
supra note 110, at 251-54; Magraw, The Bhopal Disaster: Structuring a Solution, 57 U.
COLO. L. REV. 835, 837-46; McCaffrey, Accidents Do Happen: Hazardous Technology and
International Tort Litigation, 1 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 41, 83-84 (1988). Pursuant to the order of
the Supreme Court of India, Union Carbide paid $470 million to settle the case. See N.Y.
Times, Feb. 25, 1989, at 19, col. 3.
114. See International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, Summary Report on the Post-
Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident 1 (Safety Series No. 75 - INSAG - 1,
IAEA 1986) [hereinafter cited as IAEA Summary Report].
115. See Bohlen, During Days of Delay, Children Played in Chernobyl's Dust, Wash.
Post Weekly Ed., June 22, 1987, at 19, col. 1; Some Facts on Chernobyl Revealed, 9 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 139-40 (May 14, 1986); Sullivan, Calamity Highlights Old Reactor-De-
sign Debate, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1986, at All, cols. 1-3; Diamond, Reactor Fallout is Said
to Match Past World Total, id., Sept. 23, 1986, at Al, col. 1; [hereinafter cited as Reactor
Fallout]; Diamond, Long-Term Fallout: Comparison to Bombs Altered, id., Nov. 4, 1986, at
22, cols. 1-6. [hereinafter cited as Long-Term Fallout]; Ibrahim, Soviet View on Lessons
From Chernobyl Points Up Obstacles the West Now Face, Wall St. J., Oct. 2, 1986, at 30,
VOL. 17:1
EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE AND TECHNOLOGY
According to the Soviet experts who reported at a special review
meeting convened by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna
in August 1986, the accident was caused by a series of "willful violations"
of operating procedures and human errors.116 The triggering event was a
special electrical systems test designed "to demonstrate improvement in
the capacity of the turbine generators to support essential systems during
a major station blackout."
1 17
A report prepared by nuclear safety experts said that the runaway
reaction, "an event considered to have an extremely low probability," was
caused by special design characteristics of the reactor, coupled with pur-
poseful violations of operating rules including the decision not to shut
down the reactor."' Eventually when the shift foreman ordered the shut
down of the reactor, it was too late. Within the next four seconds, the
reactor "power was calculated to have reached 100 times full power...
[which] resulted in fuel fragmentation, rapid generation of steam and ul-
timate destruction of the reactor core and associated structures.""' 9
Thirty-one people, all of whom were power plant personnel or firemen,
died while over 200 suffered from symptoms of acute radiation syndrome,
and 135,000 people were evacuated from several population centers
within a radius of 30 kilometers around the power station.'
Reporting to the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Re-
sources on the cleanup effort by the Soviet Union following the
Chernobyl accident, Yevgeny P. Velikhov, a vice president of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences and Chairman of the Energy Committee of the Su-
preme Soviet, said that tens of thousands of workers had "decontami-
nated 60,000 buildings in 500 villages," and had "built a special concrete
wall in the soil to separate the groundwater from possible penetration
into the river. This concrete wall surrounded all of the nuclear power sta-
tion and had a depth of 15 meters."'' He added that they had carted off
radioactive topsoil from an area of several square miles and had built
thousands of new houses and hundreds of social and supporting facilities
for those evacuated from the area.'2 2
While Dr. Velikhov predicted a "quite small" increase in cancer
cols. 1-2; Boffey, Panel Hears a Russian on Chernobyl, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1987, at 3, cols.
1-3.
116. See IAEA Summary Report, supra note 114, at 9, 17-30.
117. Id. at 15.
118. See id. at 13. See also Reactor Fallout, supra note 115, at 24, cols. 3-6; Boffey,
supra note 115, at col. 3; Russian Roulette at Chernobyl, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 30, 1986, at
75, col. 1.
119. IAEA Summary Report, supra note 114, at 25.
120. See id. at 6.
121. See Reviewing the Causes and Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power-
plant Incident, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess., at 3, 12 (Jan. 20, 1987).
122. Id. at 14.
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deaths in the future because of radioactive releases, 123 other experts have
predicted that thousands of cancer deaths in the future could be attrib-
uted to radioactive fallout from the Chernobyl accident." 4
As a consequence of the accident, the Soviet Union either dismissed
from their jobs or otherwise penalized at least twelve top officials.125 The
head of the nuclear power industry at the time of the accident was ex-
pelled from the Communist Party, while the director of the plant and two
assistants were sentenced to prison terms of ten years each for criminal
negligence as a result of the accident.
12
The radiation fallout from the accident caused considerable concern
and damage in many European countries. Initially, increased radiation
levels were detected in the Scandinavian countries, but, because of shift-
ing winds, several other European countries were also affected.1 2' A Po-
lish report to the International Atomic Energy Agency noted that radia-
tion was detected as early as late April 27, and the authorities who began
sampling the air, food, and the environment on April 29 found some milk
from northeastern Poland contaminated. 12 The government took preven-
tive actions, including the imposition of a ban on the pasturing of cows or
feeding them fresh fodder, forbidding children in some regions to drink
milk and giving them doses of iodine.
129
In France, on May 1-3, radiation levels rose to as high as 400 times
those normally recorded.13 0 The authorities observed increases in the ra-
dioactivity of fruits and vegetables in eastern France; however, with the
exception of the confiscation of a shipment of Alsatian spinach, there was
no national intervention in the sales of French agricultural products. 3 ' In
Greece, radiation levels were found to be 20 to 40 times higher than nor-
mal.13 2 In the United Kingdom, the public was warned to avoid drinking
rainwater in some areas of the country following the detection of the radi-
oactive cloud on the Kent Coast on May 2.1"3 On May 8, radiation levels
123. Id. at 30.
124. See Boffey, supra note 115, at cols. 2-3; Reactor Fallout, supra note 115; Long-
Term Fallout, supra note 115; The Chernobyl Toll, Wash. Post Weekly Edition, March 9,
1987, at 38, col. 4.
125. Head of Soviet Atom Power Plants and 5 Others Penalized by Party, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 15, 1986, at 4, col. 5.
126. Id. See also Bohlen, Dead Forests and a Ghost Town Are Chernobyl's Neighbors,
Wash. Post Weekly Ed., July 6, 1987, at 17, col. 1.
127. E.g., N.Y. Times, May 6, 1986, at A6, col. 3.
128. See Some Facts on Chernobyl Revealed, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 140 (May 14,
1986).
129. Id.
130. Government Withholds information, Then Says Radiation Levels Not Serious, 9
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 188 (June 11, 1986).
131. Id.
132. Supra note 128.
133. EEC Lifts Ban on East European Food Imports, Substitutes U.S. Limits on Ra-
diation Levels, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 189 (June 11, 1986); Radioactive Fallout From
Chernobyl Will Kill 40 UK Residents, Board Says, 9 Int'l. Env't Rep. (BNA) 353 (Oct. 8,
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in Scotland were reported as "the highest they [had] ever been." s Radi-
ation levels remained high in parts of England, Wales, and Scotland, and
tough restrictions on the movement and slaughter of livestock were rein-
troduced for several hillfarms in Scotland in August 1987.' Similarly,
significant increases in radiation levels were detected in Finland, 8' It-
aly,13 Ireland,' and West Germany,3 " while some iodine 131 was de-
tected in rainwater samples in the United States, and the State of Oregon
advised people not to drink rainwater. "
The Swiss government banned fishing in Lake Lugano because of an
unacceptable level of radiation in fish there" and decided to indemnify
Swiss fishermen for any loss of income they suffered as a result of the
government ban."' The West German government took 5,000 tons of
powdered milk out of circulation due to the fact that the milk contained
sixteen times the maximum level of radiation permitted for humans."
Subsequent attempts to sell the milk to Egypt ended when the West Ger-
man government impounded the milk."'
Because of the increased levels of radiation found in food imports
from the Soviet Union and the East European countries - Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Yugoslavia - the Euro-
pean Community imposed a temporary ban on such imports, which was
lifted on June 1, 1986."1 On that day, the Community imposed U.S.
equivalent, strict limits on radiation levels for imported food products
from all countries,'" and on September 30, 1986, extended those limits
for another five months."
7
Several consumer groups and environmental organizations accused
the European governments of not providing the public with the needed
1986).
134. EEC Lifts Ban, supra note 133 at 189.
135. See Radiation Levels From Chernobyl Prompt Limits on Livestock Slaughter,
Movement, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 442 (Sept. 9, 1987).
136. See Effects of Chernobyl in Finland, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 420 (Nov. 12, 1986).
137. See Salter, Living With Fallout, ATLANTIC, Jan. 1987, at 30.
138. See Excess Radioactivity Found in Birds that Fly Through Chernobyl Contami-
nation, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 456 (Dec. 10, 1986).
139. See Effects of Chernobyl Accident in April Still Felt Four Months Later in Ger-
many, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 272-73 (Aug. 13, 1986).
140. No U.S. Effects Seen, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 140 (May 14, 1986).
141. See Ban Imposed on Fishing in Lake Lugano After High Levels of Radioactivity
Found, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 366 (Oct. 8, 1986).
142. Id. For a report on the effects on the Lapps whose reindeer have been contami-
nated, see Clines, Chernobyl Shakes Reindeer Culture of Lapps, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14,
1986, at Al, col. 2; A20, col. 4.
143. See Federal Government Takes Over Problem of Disposing of Radioactive Milk
Powder, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 58 (Feb. 11, 1987); Tagliabue, Keeping Tainted Foods
Off Third World Shelves, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1987, at 2, col. 3.
144. Tagliabue, supra note 143.
145. See EEC Lifts Ban, supra note 133.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 141.
1988
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
information and not taking prompt action. For example, a Brussels-based
consumer group which represents consumers in all EEC countries criti-
cized many European countries, especially France and Belgium, for not
showing adequate concern. According to the report issued by the group,
"[ilt is significant that those countries with the highest dependence on
nuclear power tend to do the least."14
The report added that French authorities had "created a situation of
silence and ignorance,"14 9 the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and Luxembourg) showed "the least concern" and that Italy and
Belgium had allowed economic consideration to influence their deci-
sions."" Similarly, a coalition of environmental organizations called upon
the EEC Commission to propose an amendment to the Seveso Directive
- the Council Directive on Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial
Activities 51 - to cover nuclear reactors as well, for "[t]here is no reason
to exclude nuclear power plants any longer from the scope of the post-
Seveso Directive."' 1 2 They also called for the immediate closure of thirty-
one "potential Chernobyls" within the European Community.
1 53
In response to the damage caused by the radiation, the 518 member
European Parliament adopted a resolution asking the EEC Council of
Ministers to calculate losses to community farms whose contaminated
products had to be destroyed and to claim damages from the Soviet
Union, which the Parliament rebuked for failing to give timely and ade-
quate information."' The parliament also appealed for common stan-
dards of design and operation of nuclear power plants, for the creation of
an international safety inspectorate, and for the establishment of maxi-
mum doses of radiation in food products such as milk and vegetables."'
Among the responses of international organizations, the World
Health Organization (WHO) was concerned with setting guidelines for
countries affected by radiation,'5 6 while the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP) was primarily interested in the establishment of an in-
ternational monitoring network.'57 Prevention and mitigation of the con-
148. Limits on Radioactivity in Foodstuffs to be Proposed, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
272 (Aug. 13, 1986); see also How the Atom Splits Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 1986,
at 41, col. 1; Lewis, Europe After Chernobyl: Cooler Attitudes Toward Nuclear Power, N.Y.
Times, April 27, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
149. See Limits on Radioactivity in Foodstuffs to be Proposed, 9 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 272 (Aug. 13, 1986).
150. Id.




154. See id. at 179. See also OECD, The Accident at Chernobyl - Economic Damage
and Its Compensation in Europe, 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 58 (June 1987).
155. See Chernobyl Blast Triggers Debate, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 179 (June 11,
1986).
156. Some Facts on Chernobyl Revealed, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 139 (May 14, 1986).
157. Id.
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sequences of a nuclear power plant accident were of primary concern to
the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Begin-
ning in May 1986, when a special session of the Board of Governors of
IAEA met in Vienna and deliberated on these issues, 58 IAEA's activities
included the adoption by consensus at a special General Conference Ses-
sion in September 1986 of two international conventions to strengthen
international cooperation in nuclear safety and environmental protec-
tion. 159 In November of 1986, the IAEA's expert group of 173 persons
from 48 countries undertook a week-long review of its safety programs.6 0
The group called for strengthening existing IAEA standards of nuclear
safety, including its nuclear incident reporting system.' 6' It noted a need
for additional IAEA guidance on fire protection at nuclear facilities and
on procedures for mandatory tests on nuclear power reactors.6 2
The Standing Committee on Civil Liability of Nuclear Damage of the
IAEA, meeting in March 1987, proposed that the existing international
nuclear liability regimes established by the Paris Convention of 1960 and
the Vienna Convention of 1963 be enlarged through the adoption of Joint
Protocols to both conventions.'
A notable proposal of the European Community Commission for a
Council Decision was offered on August 20, 1986, on "Community System
Rapid Exchange of Information in Cases of Unusually High Levels of Ra-
dioactivity or of a Nuclear Accident.' 1 64 Subsequently, in April 1987, the
Commission presented to the Council a proposed Council Decision on the
subject,'65 under which the government concerned would immediately in-
form the Commission and other member states "of the details of the acci-
dent and other data such as meteorological conditions, radioactivity levels
in foodstuffs, measures taken to protect the public, and predicted behav-
ior of the release over time."' 66
In the wake of the Chernobyl accident, while serious questions have
been raised on the future of nuclear energy167 special efforts are being
undertaken for sharing nuclear safety information and for the establish-
ment of an adequate framework for coordinated international response to
158. For a summary of the decisions taken by the Board at that meeting, see 25 I.L.M.
1009 (1986).
159. For a summary report, see IAEA Conventions on Nuclear Safety Provide For Co-
operation in Wake of Nuclear Accident, 23 UN CHRONICLE, No. 5, Nov. 1986, at 74.
160. See Atomic Energy Agency, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 410 (Nov. 12, 1986).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 31 (June 1987).
164. COM (86) 434 Final, 20 Aug. 1986, reprinted in European Community Commis-
sion Proposal, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 377 (Oct. 8, 1986).
165. See 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 33 (June 1987).
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., the report that even the European Community's energy ministers were
unable to agree over the role of nuclear power in Europe in Ministers Disagree, 9 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) 180 (June 11, 1986).
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a nuclear accident.168
D. Basel, Switzerland
Ten years after the Seveso accident, a major toxic chemical spill oc-
curred in Europe during efforts to put out a fire at a chemical storage
warehouse of Sandoz, a major Swiss chemical multinational in Basel. The
spill, which occured November 1, 1986, resulted in a huge discharge of
toxic chemicals into the Rhine."'9 While Swiss authorities initially re-
ported that thirty tons of chemicals, including herbicides, pesticides and
poisonous mercury, leaked into the Rhine,1 70 some French reports put the
figure of the spilled chemicals as high as 1,000 tons.' Eventually, Sandoz
announced that much of the 1,246 tons of material inside the warehouse,
including 824 tons of insecticide, 71 tons of herbicide, 39 tons of fungi-
cide, 4 tons of solvents, and 12 tons of organic compounds containing
mercury, was washed into the river by the water used by the firemen in
putting out the fire.
17
1
The worst accident of this kind since Seveso caused ecological disas-
ter, adversely affecting France, Germany, and the Netherlands, in addi-
tion to Switzerland.1 7 3 Subsequent reports said that Basel escaped a ma-
jor environmental disaster "by a whisker," for the city could have been
impacted by toxic fumes if the fire had burned longer. 7 " Former West
German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, referred to Basel as "Bhopal on the
Rhine,"'1 7" and some political parties started calling it "Baselpal,"17' while
the French and West German press renamed the city "Chernobasel," or
"Chernobale. 1 7 7 On the evening of November 1, 2,000 demonstrators
168. For a recent U.S. report on international response to nuclear power safety con-
cerns, see U.S. GAO/NSIAD - 85 - 128 (1986).
169. For reports, see, e.g., Roth, Swiss Accident That Polluted the Rhine May Have
Heaviest Impact in Germany, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1986, at 41, col. 2; Lewis, Chemical Spill
in Rhine Affects Four Countries, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1986, at 1, col. 2; Netter, Anger
Along the Rhine Grows After Chemical Spill, id., Nov. 12, 1986, at 7, col. 3. [hereinafter
cited as Anger Along the Rhine]; Studer, Swiss Never Thought Sandoz Disaster Could
Happen in Their Orderly World, Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1986, at 33, col. 2; Netter, Fourth
Swiss Chemical Accident Sends a Cloud Over City of Basel, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1986, at
4, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Fourth Swiss Chemical Accident]; Netter, Swiss Look to
Tighter Regulation After Spill, id., Nov. 23, 1986, at A5, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Swiss
Regulations]; French, Germans Complain About Notice, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) at 389-90
(Nov. 12, 1986); 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) at 429-41 (Dec. 10, 1986).; 10 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 3-7 (Jan. 14, 1987).
170. See Roth, supra note 169; Tagliabue, The Rhine Struggles to Survive, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 15, 1987, at F4, col. 3.
171. See Lewis, supra note 169.
172. See Radical Measures, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 429, 430 (Dec. 10, 1986).
173. See Lewis, supra note 169, at 1, col. 2; 4, cols. 3-4; Anger Along the Rhine, supra
note 169.
174. See Independent Reports, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 102 (Mar. 11, 1987).
175. See supra note 172.
176. Id.
177. See Anger Along the Rhine, supra note 169, at 7, col. 3.
VOL. 17:1
EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE AND TECHNOLOGY
marched through the streets of Basel carrying banners which read,
"Seveso-Bhopal-Schweizerhalle." 178 Schweizerhalle is the Basel suburb
where the Sandoz plant is located. Subsequently, it was revealed that sev-
eral more incidents of chemical spills in the Rhine immediately preceding
and in the few weeks following the Basel spill had occurred which also
involved other Swiss chemical giants such as CIBA-Giegy, though report-
edly none was as serious as the Sandoz spill.' 9
The Sandoz spill and those other incidents of chemical spills in the
Rhine caused a great deal of concern in Europe. Questions raised in-
cluded those of adequate notification, safety standards, violation of pollu-
tion control laws, as well as liability and compensation.'8 0 Calls were
made for European Community action and for international cooperation
to prevent such pollution.' 8 ' The Netherlands representative told a spe-
cial meeting of environment ministers from the states bordering the
Rhine, convened in Zurich on November 12, 1986, that, following the ac-
cident, it had already spent a quarter of a million dollars on pollution
control.' 2
On December 19, 1986, the French Environment Minister presented
the Swiss government with a bill for $38 million for damages to French
interests arising from the spill.8 3 The figure of $38 million was estimated
by an independent commission of French experts based upon short-term
damages to the fishing and boating industries; medium-term damages, in-
cluding the cost to restore the ecosystem; and potential damages, includ-
ing the cost of building dams and other facilities linked to the Rhine,
such as a water pumping system, assuming that no significant pollution of
the groundwater aquifer had occurred.'84 The Swiss government and the
Sandoz and CIBA-Geigy officials showed their willingness to settle claims
for damages, although it was not clear who was to assume responsibility
for how much of the claimed damages.' 88 Subsequently, Sandoz paid
damages to French fishermen " and to the French government.' 7 Among
other developments at Sandoz, safety rules related to the storage of toxic
and flammable substances in the Sandoz group of companies were
strengthened; Sandoz also set up the "Sandoz Rhine Fund" to help repair
178. See French, Germans Complain about Notice, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 389, 390
(Nov. 12, 1986).
179. See Fourth Swiss Chemical Accident, supra note 169; Tagliabue, supra note 170;
'Radical Measures' supra note 172, at 430-431.
180. See generally, 'Radical Measures', supra note 172, at 431-433, 436.
181. See generally, id. at 440; Government Bills Switzerland, 10 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 3 (Jan. 14, 1987).
182. See supra note 172, at 432.
183. See Government Bills Switzerland, supra note 181.
184. See id.
185. See supra note 172; Sandoz Working Group Produces Report, 10 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 4 (Jan. 14, 1987).
186. Sandoz Fisherman Settle on Rhine, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 283 (June 10,
1987).
187. Sandoz and French Gov't Settle, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 492 (Oct. 14, 1987).
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ecological damage from the November 1986 disaster and announced its
donation of $7.3 million to the World Wildlife Fund for a three-year pro-
ject to restore the flora and fauna of the Rhine River.188
Among the multilateral responses to the accident, noteworthy at-
tempts include the establishment of a working group among French,
Swiss, and German representatives to update the proper functioning of
the information exchange systems and emergency contacts. 89 Also, an
agreement was reached on December 19, 1986, regarding the necessary
measures to prevent industrial accidents and to limit their consequences,
at a ministerial conference on Rhine Pollution."' Mostafa K. Tolba, exec-
utive director of UNEP, made a proposal to negotiate treaties similar to
those adopted on international notification and mutual assistance in the
event of a nuclear accident, for prevention of transboundary toxic
pollution. 91
Tolba said at a press conference on December 15, 1986, that UNEP's
existing International Register of Potentially Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC)
could act as a framework for administering the two treaties. 2 He said
that, as there are no existing agreements requiring international notifica-
tion in the case of an accident involving toxic chemicals, a new conven-
tion on the subject is desirable. " Commenting on the Sandoz incident,
Tolba said that the chemical spill at Basel "shows the ecological and eco-
nomic folly of assuming that, if we ignore safety standards in the chemi-
cal industry, somehow the problems will go away." 9 ' He added that
"[tjhe accident reveals the full extent of the apathy, confusion, and gen-
eral unpreparedness of the world's most advanced nations and the
deplorable inadequacy of international legislation."' 9 A notification re-
quirement would obligate governments to provide instant information on
the chemicals involved and their predicted behavior, the location of the
plant, and the safety measures undertaken. The second convention would
call for prompt assistance among states parties after an accident to mini-
mize damage and harm.
Earlier, on November 20, 1986, Tolba had suggested that "a legal
package should be drafted to prevent another Bhopal or another Ba-
sel."'19 As part of that package, he outlined the need for "instituting a
program for governments, in cooperation with industry, to work with local
leaders to identify acutely toxic chemicals, help prepare control measures
188. See Sandoz Accident Seen as New Impetus for Regulatory Actions Already in
Works, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 81,82 (Feb. 11, 1987).
189. See id. at 82.
190. See Sandoz Working Group, supra note 185, at 5.
191. See id. at 6-7.
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to limit accidental releases and deal with such accidents.' ' 97
V. ISSUES RELATING TO THE EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS TECHNOLOGIES
The issues which emerge from the factual analyses of these four di-
sasters tend to cut across the facile developed/developing country distinc-
tion. States often play more than one role in these situations by acting
both as a home country and as a recipient country. However, while recipi-
ent countries in general face many potential problems as a result of their
import of hazardous technologies, developing states that import these
technologies or substances often face especially difficult problems due to
an increased potential for risk, as many lack effective health, safety, and
environmental standards and systems.
This differential in levels of risk between a more-developed recipient
country, such as Italy, and a less-developed recipient country, such as In-
dia, is illustrated by the respective human losses that were suffered in the
Seveso and Bhopal disasters. There has been, to date, no loss of life di-
rectly attributable to the Seveso accident. The loss of lives from Bhopal
has exceeded 2,000 people, with many of the early deaths resulting from
blocked air passages which led to injury to respiratory tissue. 98 This is
not to suggest that the value of human life in developing countries is less
than in developed countries, but rather that, for historical reasons, the
potential risks in developing countries have tended to be higher.
A. International Legal Norms
International environmental law is still in a nascent stage of develop-
ment and is not yet adequately equipped to provide the necessary assur-
ances to the recipient countries in the transfer of hazardous technology
that their interests will be protected under applicable norms of interna-
tional law. Conversely, the applicable international legal norms do not de-
fine the responsibility of the exporting or home country to any apprecia-
ble extent. Although the current prescriptions by international bodies are
usually in the form of non-binding guidelines and principles, the impor-
tance of such non-binding principles in eventually shaping environmental
law should not be underestimated. They allow experimentation and
growth, they create community expectations and influence state behavior,
and, as happened with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,'9"
some of these declarations and principles acquire the status of customary
international law. For example, in the area of technology transfer, one
could argue that the principles of notification, information exchange and
consultation, among emerging principles of international environmental
197. See id.
198. See supra notes 77-78; Toxic Substances, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 133 (Apr. 9,
1986).
199. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972).
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law, should be considered to have acquired the status of customary inter-
national law.
The primary international legal principle in this area, drawn from
the Trail Smelter Arbitration,'2 0 0 generally applies to states rather than to
private actors. The decision in that case formulated the following rule:
that it is unlawful for a state to cause transfrontier pollution which en-
tails serious damage in another state. However, for both Seveso and Bho-
pal, unlike Chernobyl and the Sandoz fire in Basel, the activity in ques-
tion did not generate pollution in the home state which then crossed a
boundary to affect the people, property, or environment of an adjoining
state. Rather, the whole industrial process took place within a single state
and the resultant damage also occurred within that state. Furthermore,
the activities which took place at both the Union Carbide and Givaudan
plants, at least arguably, did not inherently result in pollution. The fact
that accidents did occur may have been a consequence of problems with
operating procedures and not the activity itself. Therefore, this principle
is not directly applicable to either of those two disasters.
As noted above, some commentators have suggested that customary
international law does place a duty upon states to cooperate when dealing
with questions of transfrontier pollution.2 ' Related to this duty of coop-
eration are the duties to provide information and to consult and negoti-
ate. ' However, again, these principles have in the past been applied to
activities which occur in areas in geographic proximity to international
borders and were not generally applied to industrial activity which occurs
only within one state when the effects of that activity are likewise limited.
The current efforts to formulate "informed consent" guidelines of the
EEC and the United States may be extending these principles to situa-
tions such as Bhopal and Seveso.
This absence of norms is inextricably intertwined with the absence of
appropriate international institutions and fora within which to maintain a
claim once damage has been inflicted. This has meant that victims have
had to rely upon national law and national court systems: for Seveso, Ital-
ian law and courts; for Bhopal, Indian law and courts; for the Sandoz
incident, assumedly the various national laws of the victims and the ap-
plicable Swiss laws would be invoked; but in the case of Chernobyl, it is
not yet clear how and what setting and under the application of what law
200. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1911 (1938); see
also Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
201. See, e.g., Bothe, International Problems of Industrial Siting In Border Areas and
National Environmental Policies, in TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE
STATES 79-97 (OECD 1981); Silva, Pending Problems on International Law of the Environ-
ment, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT 217 (R. Dupuy, ed.
1985).
202. See Bothe, supra note 201; International Law Association, Committee on Legal
Aspects of the Conservation of the Environment, Report to the Manila Conference 1978;
Handl, National Uses of Transboundary Air Resources: The International Entitlement Is-
sue Reconsidered 26 NAT. RES. J. 405, at 412-13 (1986).
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would the claims against the Soviet Union be resolved."0 3 The Soviet
Union has refused to pay any compensation for crop losses in western
European countries resulting from radioactive fallout from Chernobyl, al-
though the Soviets claim that cleanup and relocation costs will total at
least $2.98 billion.
2 0 4
Additionally, these national courts and legal traditions may or may
not be equipped to provide a speedy and just resolution for claims
brought by those damaged by the pollution in question. In the case of
Seveso, Hoffmann-LaRoche accepted responsibility for the accident early
on, with the negotiations and court actions focusing primarily upon issues
of the amount of compensation and the individual responsibility of the
officials involved. A similar pattern is discernible following the Sandoz
incident. For Bhopal, the issue of responsibility remains unresolved, per-
haps in part because the level of damage is so much higher, and, in the





In the absence of directly applicable, international legal norms, the
presence or absence of international standards assumes a greater impor-
tance. Prior to the Seveso accident, efforts had begun to address what was
perceived by members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) as a need for coordination of the activities of the
members in the toxic substances area. In 1971, the Sector Group on the
Unintended Occurrence of Chemicals in the Environment (Chemicals
Group) was formed. While the coordination function of the Chemicals
Group became more important following the Seveso accident, initially the
group formulated four major sets of recommendations for the member
governments. The first of these was the limitation on the use of PCBs;20,
the second was the reduction of environmental discharges of mercury;0 '
the third was the keeping of statistics on existing chemicals and the as-
sessment of the potential effects of new chemicals prior to manufac-
ture;208 and the fourth was procedures for anticipating the effects of new
chemicals, of new applications of existing chemicals, and of selected ex-
203. See, e.g., Malone, The Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in International Law
Regulating State Responsibility for Transboundary Nuclear Pollution, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 203 (1987).
204. See Lee, Chernobyl and the Nuclear Reaction, Wash. Post Weekly Ed., Nov. 10,
1986, at 6, col. 1.
205. See id.; Malone, supra note 203.
206. O.E.C.D. Doc. C. (73), Feb. 20, 1973.
207. O.E.C.D. Doc. C. (73) 172, Oct. 2, 1973.
208. O.E.C.D. Doc. C (74) 215, Nov. 21, 1974.
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isting chemicals. 09
The Chemicals Group also devoted part of its budget to coordination
of the various laboratory testing approaches employed by the OECD
members. Little attention was devoted to information exchange even af-
ter the Seveso accident. The group also focused a portion of its efforts on
the economic effects of toxic substances legislation. In particular, the
group looked at the effects of inconsistent approaches among member
countries to chemical assessment and control, although this emphasis did
not appear in earnest until nearly two years after the Seveso disaster."'
The OECD Council subsequently adopted two further recommenda-
tions prior to the events of late 1984 at Bhopal. In February of that year,
the Council recommended to member states principles on transfrontier
movements of hazardous waste.21" ' The recommendation called for the ex-
change of "adequate and timely information," which should include spec-
ifying "the origin, nature, composition, and quantities of waste intended
to be exported, the conditions of carriage, the nature of environmental
risks involved, the type of disposal and the identity of all entities con-
cerned with the transfrontier movement or the disposal of the waste."2 2
Then in April of 1984, the Council adopted a recommendation concerning
information exchange related to the export of banned or severely re-
stricted chemicals.
21 3
This recommendation provided guidelines to the exporting country
regarding the nature and scope of information it should provide the im-
porting country so as "to enable the latter to make timely and informed
decisions concerning the chemical." The recommendation specifically
called for the OECD Chemicals Group and the Management Committee
of the Special Programs on Chemicals, to submit a report to the Council
by April 1987 on implementation of the recommendation. 21 It is reported
that most countries are beginning to take action regarding information
exchange on chemicals.2 5
Both of these latter recommendations sought primarily to restrict or
control specific chemicals, products, or waste materials. Neither focused
on regulation of the movement of the actual technology from state to
state, with the result that, while the individual chemicals such as methyl
isocyanate or trichlorophenol gas may have come within the ambit of the
recommendations, the installations in Meda and Bhopal themselves did
not. Furthermore, the Council recommendations were directed to member
209. O.E.C.D. Doc. C. (77) 97, July 13, 1977.
210. See Schweitzer, Toxic Chemicals: Steps Toward Their Evaluation and Control, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION, 22-44 (D. Kay & H. Jackson,
eds., 1983).
211. O.E.C.D. Doc. C. (83) 180 (Final), Feb. 13, 1984.
212. Id., Principle 5.2.
213. O.E.C.D. Doc. C. (84) 37 (Final), May 3, 1984. See also 23 I.L.M. 664 (1984).
214. See Export Proposal, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 391, 392 (Nov. 12, 1986).
215. See id.
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countries and would not necessarily have been applicable in a transfer to
a non-OECD country.
b. Post-Bhopal
After the Bhopal accident, a stronger emphasis on the control of in-
dustrial processes and installations emerged from the OECD. In Decem-
ber of 1985, the OECD's Committee on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises agreed to incorporate environmental concerns
into the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises by means of a "clarifica-
tion" of a reference to environmental protection already included. The
guidelines indicated that multinationals were to "give due consideration
to the member countries' aims and priorities with regard to the protection
of the environment and consumer interests."2 6
The Environmental Committee of the OECD set forth its environ-
ment program for 1987 and beyond in April of 1986. The Committee em-
phasized the control of chemicals, hazardous wastes, and air pollutants,
and economic development and the environment.s 17 A project to suggest
ways to improve the environmental assessment capabilities of private in-
vestors who undertake environmentally sensitive projects in developing
countries was resisted by the United States. Also discussed was a propo-
sal to review regulations and practices in member countries with regard to
the control of hazardous installations and to investigate possible OECD
guidelines for such installations.
2 18
c. Post-Chernobyl and Basel
After the 1986 initiatives, the Environment Committee of the OECD
concluded at its next meeting that, in light of the incidents at Chernobyl
and Basel, a major priority for its work for 1987 would be the prevention
of and response to industrial accidents. 1 9 The conclusion was reached at
a meeting of the committee in Paris on December 9-11, 1986.220 Specifi-
cally, the committee elevated its already planned project on hazardous
installations to "a high priority for 1987. ''221
The Environment Committee highlighted four themes for the project:
(1)the need to provide "adequate and timely information" to all con-
cerned parties in the case of an accident in which toxic substances are
released;
(2)the need for better coordination, both nationally and across the bor-
ders, pertaining to the detection, monitoring, and response to toxic
216. See id. Jan. 8, 1986, at 11.
217. 'Rationalized, Streamlined' Program Agreed by OECD Environment Committee,
9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 153 (May 14, 1986).
218. Id.
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releases;
(3)the need to provide for compensation to those who suffer damages
from accidental release and for cleanup or environmental restoration
costs; and,
(4)the need to take preventive steps and, in the event of an accident, the
development of emergency preparedness and response plans.222
Erik Lykke, head of the OECD Environment Directorate, announced
that by 1989 the OECD will develop an "integrated approach for the con-
trol of toxic substances in the environment," with the objective of formu-
lating effective "overall" control strategies for toxic substances of all
kinds.
2 3
In March 1987, senior environmental protection officials from the
member nations of OECD agreed "to take a 'leading role' in strengthen-
ing international cooperation for the prevention of and response to indus-
trial accidents and to act to broaden national programs and international
cooperation in the areas of testing and control of 'existing' chemicals. '224
The agreement was a result of a French initiative.
225
In the wake of the Chernobyl accident, the Nuclear Energy Agency
(NEA), whose program is shaped by the Steering Committee for Nuclear
Energy of the OECD, selected the following priority items for its 1987
agenda: strengthening the NEA Incident Reporting System; expanding
work on studies on serious accidents; achieving more effective harmoniza-
tion and implementation of protection measures against radiation expo-
sure in accident situations; and "developing more comprehensive and effi-





Little in the way of multinational guidelines or standards was extant
in the European Economic Community prior to the Seveso accident.
However, following that disaster, the EEC began to develop a joint ap-
proach to hazards resulting from major accidents, based upon the mem-
ber states' assessment that such an approach allowed them to pool their
expertise, to minimize industrial safety controls as a source of competitive
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. OECD Nations to Take 'Leading Role' on Accident Prevention, Chemicals Test-
ing, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 145 (April 8, 1987).
225. Id. at 146.
226. Reactor Safety, Post-Accidnet Protection Said to Dominate 1987 Work Program
of NEA, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 410 (Nov. 11, 1986). For a report on the safety of nuclear
reactors in EOCD countries, see Nuclear Energy Agency, OECD, Chernobyl and the Safety
of Nuclear Reactors in OECD Countries (Report by NEA Group of Experts 1987).
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advantage or disadvantage, to merge accident and hazard control with
their toxic chemicals control policy, to reduce the negative impact upon
all industry that is caused by such accidents, and to address the special
circumstances that are produced by plants located near international
boundaries."
As a culmination of these EEC efforts, the Council Directive on Ma-
jor Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities (so-called Seveso Di-
rective) was formulated in mid-1982 by the Council of the European
Communities.22 8 The goals of this directive were (1) to prevent major ac-
cidents caused by industrial activities and (2) to limit the effects of such
accidents if they did occur. 29 The Seveso Directive provided for a system
of alarm and notification procedures when incidents involving dangerous
chemicals occurred and, as it closely mirrored the events which occurred
at the Icmesa plant, the directive therefore addressed process installa-
tions and included storage and transportation of chemicals within its defi-
nition of industrial activity. 30 The regulatory framework created under
the Directive takes into account the nature and quantity of dangerous
substances handled at a given plant and the type of activity conducted
there.2 31 One of the limitations of this directive, as with many such Coun-
cil Directives, is that the implementation of the mandatory provisions
was by and large left to the discretion of each member state. As a result,
several of the members of the EEC have been quite slow in carrying out
the mandated actions.232 As of June 1987, only six of the twelve commu-
nity members had fully implemented the Seveso directive.23 s
b. Post-Bhopal
About one year after the Bhopal accident, the EEC proposed that the
Seveso Directive be strengthened by means of a lowering of the thresh-
olds for the substances listed in Annexes III and IV of the directive. " 4
These thresholds established the quantity of each substance, above which
a company must notify the host country of the presence of the substance.
Then, in early 1986, the EEC also opened up informal talks with industry
representatives regarding a voluntary code of conduct on the transfer of
227. See von Moltke, Bhopal and Seveso - Avoiding a Recurrence, THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL FORUM 21-23 (June 1985).
228. Directive 82/501/EEC, 5 O.J. No. L 230, 1 (1982), as amended by Directive 87/216/
EEC, March 19, 1987.
229. Id. art. 1. See also art. 3.
230. Id. art. 1.
231. See id. art. 3.
232. For a recent report on the lack of implementation by member states, see Most
Members Have Not Reported Activities Under Seveso Directive, Commission Reveals, 10
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 17 (Jan. 14, 1987).
233. Six Members Have Fully Implemented Sevesco Directive, EC Officials State, 10
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 327 (July 8, 1987).
234. Proposal for a Council Directive Amending Directive 81/501/EEC on the Major
Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, Corn (85) 572 (Final), Nov. 4, 1985.
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potentially dangerous technology to developing countries.235
c. Post-Chernobyl and Basel
In the wake of the Chernobyl accident, the EEC Commission was
concerned with setting uniform standards on levels of radioactivity in
foodstuffs as well as on radiation exposure for nuclear industry workers
and the general public, and the creation of an "ultra-rapid" information-
exchange system for use in the event of nuclear accidents.2 3 In August
1986, the Commission proposed a "Council Decision on a Community
System of Rapid Exchange of Information in Cases of Unusually High
Levels of Radioactivity or of a Nuclear Accident." ' Under the proposal,
a member state would be obligated to notify the Commission whenever it:
measure[d] unusually high levels of radioactivity from the point of
view of health protection or protection of the environment or when-
ever a nuclear accident or another event occur[red] on the territory of
a Member State and there [was] the potential for, or actual occur-
rence of, an abnormal [sic] high release of radioactivity [sic]
materials.138
Subsequently, it was announced in May 1987 that the Commission had
drawn up an elaborate information exchange scheme which would enable
the Community member nations and the Commission to react quickly
and effectively to minimize the risks of a nuclear accident. 2 9 The Com-
mission also developed plans to establish an inspectorate to monitor
safety standards at nuclear power stations throughout the EEC.2'"
Following the Sandoz incident, the EEC Environmental Affairs Com-
missioner, Stanley Clinton Davis, told the European Parliament on No-
vember 13, 1986, that if Switzerland, which is not a member of the Euro-
pean Committee, had adopted a Seveso-type legislation, the ecological
damage and the resulting pollution of the Rhine in the aftermath of the
Sandoz fire "would have been substantially reduced. 24 1 He said that, in
light of the Rhine incident, the EEC Commission will convene a meeting
of experts to review the Seveso directive and suggest possible improve-
ments. 42 Davis also noted that, as of December 1986, only four member
235. EEC, Industry Discusses Code of Conduct for Transfer of Technology to Third
World, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 33-34 (1986).
236. Limits on Radioactivity in Foodstuffs to be Proposed Clinton Davis Announces, 9
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 272 (August 13, 1986).
237. See COM (86) 434 (Final), Aug. 20, 1986.
238. Id. art. 1.
239. EC Proposed Information Exchange Strategy Aimed at Quick Response to Nu-
clear Accidents, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 271-72 (June 10, 1987).
240. Nuclear Power Prospects for Long Term Down 40 to 50%; Agency Reports, 9 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 350-351 (Oct. 8, 1986).
241. Commission Steps Up Law Enforcement Following Rhine Pollution Occurance, 9
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 436 (Dec. 10, 1986).
242. Id.
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states - Denmark, France, the United Kingdom, and West Germany -
had implemented the Seveso directive and the new Community members,
Portugal and Spain, were given a time extension. ' 3 According to Davis,
the other community states which had not incorporated the 1982 Seveso
directive into their national laws faced an initial warning which would be
followed by legal action against them in the European Court of Justice at
Luxembourg.24 4 Subsequently, he reported that the Commission had in-
stituted proceedings against Ireland and Luxembourg for failure to imple-
ment the Seveso Directive, and against Belgium, The Netherlands, Italy,
and Greece for incomplete information. " 5
Compliance of the European community members with another of
their obligations under the Seveso Directive, the provision of information
on their national inventory of industrial activities,246 has also been inade-
quate. It was reported following the Sandoz incident that the required
information regarding the names and locations of plants, the types of in-
dustrial activities carried out, and the names of dangerous substances in-
volved, had been provided by only five member countries - Ireland, It-
aly, Denmark, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 4"
The Sandoz incident also prompted the EEC Environment ministers
to ask the EEC Commission to explore the possibility of negotiating bilat-
eral or multilateral treaties with non-EEC members to extend coverage of
the Seveso Directive beyond the European Community borders.248 They
outlined three key elements which should underlie multilateral negotia-
tions aimed at achieving "better environmental protection of the Rhine
and other major waterways affecting the community: the improvement of
the alarm and information system in case of accidental discharges of toxic
chemicals; closer harmonization of national legislation on handling of
such chemicals"; and "prompt cleanup, restoration, and equitable com-
pensation and liability arrangements" for pollution damage by those re-
sponsible for originating it.249
Earlier, on July 2, 1986, the EEC Commission submitted to the
Council a proposed "Regulation Concerning Export From and the Import
Into the Community of Certain Dangerous Chemicals."'2 50 With the objec-
tive of establishing common notification and information procedures for
imports and exports of banned or severely restricted chemicals,2 51 the
proposed Council regulation would require an exporter of such chemicals,
243. See id. at 435.
244. See id. at 436.
245. Most Members Have Not Reported, supra note 232.
246. The obligation of the states is contained in article 5 of the Seveso Directive, supra
note 228.
247. Most Members Have Not Reported, supra note 232.
248. Extension of Seveso Oil Spill Legislation to Non-EEC Countries Discussed by
Ministers, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 443 (Dec. 10, 1986).
249. See id.
250. COM (86) 362 Final, July 2, 1986.
251. Id., art. 1.
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a list of which is contained in an annex,2 5 2 to notify the designated au-
thority of the exporting EEC member.2 5 For the initial export of any of
such materials, the exporting country would then inform the Commission,
which would in turn notify the country of destination.25 ' The Commission
would then inform the exporting country "of any relevant reaction from
the country of destination.2 5 51 Beginning in 1989, the importing country
would have to give consent to any shipment of such chemicals.2" Earlier
council directives on packaging and labeling would also apply to the ship-
ment of such chemicals. 5 7 As was perhaps to be expected, chemical in-
dustry officials reacted negatively to this proposal, warning that the pro-
posed regulation could adversely affect the European industry's
competitive position.'"
3. United Nations Guidelines and Standards
Prior to Seveso, the primary U.N. vehicle for activity in the area of
the environmental consequences of economic development and the trans-
fer of hazardous technology was the United Nations Environment Pro-
gram (UNEP), established as a result of the Stockholm Conference in
1972.2159 By the mid-1970s, UNEP had become involved in the area of the
export of dangerous pesticides.2 6 0 UNEP's role here was primarily an in-
formational one with no power to regulate. As a result, UNEP gave advi-
sory opinions and generally reacted to problems that arose rather than
attempting to anticipate them. Subsequently, it has been involved in a
program on provisional notification of banned and severely restricted
chemicals.""
One aspect of UNEP's work, the International Registry of Potentially
Toxic Chemicals (IRPTC), which was designed to compile a list of all
such chemicals, is now complete, and now, the next phase is to start a
program of monitoring banned chemicals around the world and their ef-
fects on human health.2 2 The IRPTC is presently engaged in the moni-
toring of UNEP's program on provisional notification of banned and se-
verely restricted chemicals, and its work in risk assessment operations in
the use of chemicals.263
252. Id. Annex I.
253. Id. art. 3 (2).
254. Id. art. 3 (3).
255. Id.
256. Id. art. 4.
257. Id. art. 6.
258. CEFIC Official Says Export Proposal could Hurt Industry's Competitiveness, 9
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 390-91 (1986).
259. G.A. Res. 2997, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 43, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
260. U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC/31 (1975).
261. UNEP Group Moves From List Compilation To Monitoring Banned Chemicals
Worldwide, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 357-58 (Oct. 8, 1986).
262. Id. at 357.
263. Id. at 358.
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Following Seveso, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution
on "Protection against products harmful to health and the environment"
in December of 1982.26 The resolution stated that banned products
should be sold abroad only on the receiving country's request or if the
consumption of such products is officially permitted in the importing
country. "Full information" on the severely restricted products was also
called for by the resolution.
The World Health Organization, which had been involved with inter-
national pesticide regulation since the late 1960s,2 5 issued a report
through its Committee on Environmental Pollution Control in Relation to
Development in mid-1985." The report concluded that environmental
considerations should be included in all phases of the planning and deci-
sion-making process which lead to formulation of development plans. The
report further indicated that the assessment of the health effects of major
developmental programs, particularly risk assessment, by developing
countries was at present far from satisfactory.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) participated in setting
up a task force in late 1985 with a focus on preventing major industrial
accidents, such as the Bhopal disaster. The task force was to assist in
major hazard audits and to advise governments on setting priorities, up-
grading factory inspectorates, and planning training programs.2 67 The
ILO was also to establish checklists for monitoring standards on major
hazard installations, to prepare a comprehensive manual on major hazard
control, and to begin work on a code of practice on prevention of major
accidents involving hazardous materials or processes.
2 68
In early 1986, UNEP gave its backing to the establishment of an in-
ternational environment bureau to direct industries' involvement in envi-
ronmental issues.2 9 The proposed bureau would be run through the In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce, although it would be autonomously
funded and staffed. The primary functions of the bureau would be to
serve as an information coordinating entity and to produce case studies
on companies' experiences in environmental management. The continued
emphasis on information generation and coordination rather than regula-
tion that characterizes other U.N. efforts in this area was thus
maintained.
In addition, the U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations
264. Resolution 37/137, adopted Dec. 17, 1982.
265. See, e.g., World Health Organization/Food and Agricultural Organization, Guide-
lines for Legislation Concerning the Registration for Sale and Marketing of Pesticides,
WHO Doc. OH/69.3, FAO Doc. PL:CP/21 (1969).
266. Development Plans in Third World Countries Should Assess Environment, WHO
Report Says, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 237 (July 10, 1985).
267. ILO Asked to Set Up Task Force, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 367 (Nov. 13, 1985).
268. Id.
269. New International Bureau to Address Industry's Role, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
49 (Feb. 12, 1986).
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(UNCTC) issued a report which evaluated transnational corporations and
issues related to the environment.2 70 This report found it likely that gov-
ernments in developing countries, in the wake of the Bhopal disaster,
would impose new requirements for disclosure of information that would
allow them to make more effective risk assessments of new plants and
equipment. The UNCTC reported that safety considerations had not
been given priority attention during the approval process for foreign di-
rect investment or technology acquisition by developing countries. Partly
as a result of the India/Union Carbide litigation, the report also suggested
that international aspects of insurance issues relating to environmental
management were straining the ability of existing civil procedures for the
settlement of such cases.
2 71
4. Multilateral Development Banks
Prior to Bhopal, the multilateral development banks, and particu-
larly the World Bank, exhibited little direct concern over the potential
environmental effects of the projects which were built as a result of bank
funding. The World Bank did develop a handbook which set forth the
procedures to be followed in evaluating a particular project proposal and
the expected environmental consequences. That 1971 handbook at-
tempted to provide guidance on the identification, detection, measure-
ment, and control of adverse environmental effects for any given pro-
ject.2"2 In 1985, the World Bank updated that handbook to bring it more
in line with an emphasis on sustained economic development that implic-
itly depends upon environmental concern.27 The updated version of the
handbook placed environmental analysis of a project as a separate factor
to be looked at by the World Bank in evaluating a project.
2 74
Early in 1985, the World Bank issued its own guidelines on the use of
pesticides in developing countries. These guidelines emphasized that the
choice of pesticides for use by developing countries should be based on
strict environmental and health criteria.
2 75
Later that year, draft guidelines for controlling major industrial acci-
dent hazards in developing countries were also issued by the World
Bank.2 71 The hazards guidelines, which were for use on projects involving
pesticides, fertilizers, petrochemicals, and methanol, were drawn from the
270. Third World May Require More Information to Improve Risk Assessment, 9 Int'l
Env't Rep. (BNA) 34 (Feb. 12, 1986).
271. Id. at 35.
272. See Lee, The Environment, Public Health, and Human Ecology, (World Bank
1985). For an extensive background discussion of this topic, see Rich, The Multilateral De-
velopment Banks, Environmental Policy, and The United States, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 681
(1985).
273. See Lee, supra note 272.
274. Id.
275. World Bank's Guidelines, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 124 (Apr. 10, 1985).
276. Guides on Accident Hazards, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 112 (Apr. 10, 1985).
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EEC's Seveso Directive and therefore included industrial processes and
the storage and transport of hazardous materials.277 Under the guidelines,
hazardous operations were classified on the basis of the quantity of the
substance stored or processed at the site or transported. Project develop-
ers were required to show that they had recognized any major risks, had
taken measures to prevent accidents and minimize the effects of those
that do occur, and prepare emergency plans for dealing with such acci-
dents that were compatible with off-site measures drawn up by local
authorities."'
Legislation passed by the U.S. Congress in late 1985 increased pres-
sure on the multilateral banks in this area by calling upon the directors of
the banks to ensure that there was a thorough evaluation of the potential
environmental problems associated with all proposed loans for projects
involving large impoundments of rivers in tropical countries, penetration
roads into undeveloped areas, and agricultural and rural development
programs.'7 This legislation provided the groundwork for efforts by the
U.S. and Scandinavian directors of the World Bank to hold up a loan for
massive regional development scheme in Brazil until the environmental
consequences of the project were more thoroughly evaluated.2"'
In the 1986 appropriations measure, the United States Congress reaf-
firmed a direct linkage of environmental issues and development fund-
ing."' This resulted in strengthening the pertinent provisions of the 1985
bill, such as requiring instructions to the executive directors of the multi-
lateral development banks to promote the commitment of their institu-
tions to add ecologically trained and experienced people to their staff and
to promote consultations in the countries receiving bank loans with non-
governmental organizations that may be adversely affected by the
projects.2"2 In addition, among new provisions in 1986, one directs the
U.S. Agency for International Development to compile categorized lists of
proposed projects which are likely to have adverse effects on the environ-
ment, natural resources, or indigenous peoples, and the U.S. executive di-
rectors are to be instructed to seek changes necessary to eliminate or mit-
igate these effects.283 Another mandates that policies similar to those now
governing pesticide use be formulated for application to other industrial
277. Id.
278. Id. at 113.
279. US Representatives, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 50 (Feb. 12, 1986); MDB Develop-
ment Policies, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 150 (May 14, 1986). See also Rich, Environmental
Management and Multilateral Development Banks, 10 CULT. SURVIVAL Q. 4 (1986).
280. Environmental Defense Fund Newsletter, December 1986, at 2.
281. For a succinct analysis, see Walsh, World Bank Pressed on Environmental Re-
forms, 234 SCIENCE 813 (Nov. 14, 1986).
282. Id. at 814. See also House Panel Reports Foreign Aid Bill, 9 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 277, 278 (Aug. 13, 1986); A Greener Hue for Development Aid, THE ECONOMIST,
March 28, 1987, at 69, col. 1.
283. House Panel Reports, supra note 282.
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chemicals as well. 284
Some positive developments have occurred since the new president of
the World Bank, Barber B. Conable, acknowledged the thrust of these
legislative efforts at the annual meeting of the Bank in the fall of 1986,
noting that attention to environment was essential for sustained
development. 85
C. National Standards and Regulations
1. General
The picture which emerges from an analysis of national perspectives
on transfer of hazardous technologies is somewhat blurred by the fact
that a single country can be, and often is, both a recipient country and an
exporting country. For example, the Bhopal plant had a sister plant in
the United States which was based upon the same design plans. The Ba-
sel accident illustrated the fact that Switzerland, which was the home
country for the parent company of Givaudan, ten years later became the
site of its own industrial disaster. Therefore, contradictory perspectives
on the issues in this area can often be found within a single country.
2. Industrialized Countries
The members of the EEC have been slow on the uptake with regard to
the implementation of the Seveso Directive. It took almost six years from
the time of the accident for that directive to even take effect, and, by
mid-1984, Italy, Greece, and Belgium still had all failed to take the neces-
sary steps to bring themselves into compliance.2 86 Italy, in particular, had
been dragging its feet, as the European Commission threatened to take
Italy to the European Court of Justice over Italy's failure by 1981 to im-
plement five directives dealing with PCBs, waste oil, and water-related
matters.2 87 This reluctance to take the necessary measures can be attrib-
uted to the manner in which the directive was formulated, as it left the
implementation to the discretion of the member states. With regulatory
responsibility usually compartmentalized among worker safety and envi-
ronmental agencies and concerns over the likelihood that disparate regu-
lation by individual member states would create unequal competitive con-
ditions, there was little impetus for countries, such as Italy, to develop
the required legislation if that legislation offered no direct economic ben-
efits to the country. In fact, the perception often was that the implement-
284. Walsh, supra note 281 at 814.
285. Id. at 815. On the current situation, see Nanda, Human Rights and Environmen-
tal Considerations in the Leading Policies of International Development Agencies - An
Introduction, 17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 26-51 (1988).
286. Compliance by Belgium, Greece, Italy, 7 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 220 (July 11,
1984).
287. Court Actions Brought against Italy, 4 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 786 (Nov. 4, 1981).
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ing legislation would create negative economic effects by increasing manu-
facturing costs to the companies that would be impacted by the new law
and regulations and, therefore, was to be avoided for as long as possible.
However, within a few months of the Bhopal disaster, a new attitude
towards hazardous installations was perceptible within the Common Mar-
ket Countries. Legislation in France was drafted which would permit no
construction, residential or commercial, within a required safety zone
around such hazardous plants.288 This legislation would apply to installa-
tions already subject to the Seveso Directive. Belgium and Italy followed
suit shortly thereafter by introducing the necessary legislation to bring
themselves into compliance with the directive. 89 The United Kingdom
also drafted new guidelines which addressed issues of emergency planning
for industrial sites. This planning was to be completed in consultation
with local authorities and public emergency services.""
Following the Chernobyl accident, several members of the European
community, including Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Luxembourg,
and West Germany, expressed concern about the safety and security at
the controversial French nuclear power plant at Cattenom, near the Lux-
embourg and West German borders.291 After a clearance from the EEC
Commission, however, the French government started up its first reactor
at the plant on October 14, 1986.292 Subsequent attempts to halt Catte-
nom by the use of judicial proceedings were unsuccessful.29
National legislation in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident in-
cluded the 1987 French Decree on the High Council for Nuclear Safety
and Information, 294 under which the Council is charged with informing
the public and the media on questions of nuclear safety and on incidents
and accidents occurring in nuclear installations. The Federal Republic of
Germany enacted the Preventive Radiation Protection Act in December
1986,295 which provides for a clear distribution of administrative powers
between the federal government and the states in organizing preventive
measures against radioactive contamination caused by nuclear accidents
and similar events. Sweden issued two ordinances, in force as of April 1,
288. Bill Would Establish Safety Zone, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 35 (Feb. 13, 1985).
289. Law to Implement "Seveso Directives", 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 90 (Feb. 13,
1985); Minister of Health Issues Order, Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 120 (Apr. 10, 1985).
290. Executive Issues Emergency Planning Guide, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 366 (Nov.
13, 1985).
291. See, e.g., Officials of Germany, Luxembourg Focus on Security, 9 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 274, 275 (Aug. 13, 1986); Foreign Ministers Protest Building of Nuclear Plants Near
Borders, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 350 (Oct. 8, 1986).
292. France Starts up First Cattenom Reactor After Getting Clearance by EEC Com-
mission, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 409, 410 (Nov. 12, 1986).
293. Court Declines again to Halt Cattenom, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 60 (Feb. 11,
1987).
294. See 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 13 (June 1987).
295. See id. at 16.
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1987,296 which provide for compensation to persons who suffered eco-
nomic losses as a result of the Chernobyl accident. Earlier, in January
1987, the Swedish Parliament amended the 1984 Act on Nuclear Activi-
ties, under which there is a prohibition against the granting of a license to
construct a nuclear power plant.2 97 The amendments entered into force
on February 1, 1987.298
After the Basel accident, several countries, including West Germany,
France, Switzerland, and Canada, adopted stringent safety measures to
prevent toxic chemical spills. At a meeting of Environment Ministers
from the EEC countries on November 25, 1986, West German Environ-
ment Minister, Walter Wallmann, urged the EEC to adopt stringent stan-
dards for chemical plants and to conduct a review of industrial liability
laws in Europe.2 99 Earlier, on November 18, he ordered the regional au-
thorities in West Germany to make a list specifying the location of all
pesticide warehouses in the country and called for a strengthening of
safety standards. 0 0 Subsequently, on December 3, he announced that the
list of dangerous substances covered by West Germany's environmental
regulations would be widened and that requirements for companies re-
porting pollution incidents to the authorities would be further
strengthened.3 01
The French Environment Ministry started taking steps to establish
"safety" or "isolation" zones around hazardous installations.3 02 On De-
cember 17, 1986, it announced several new measures for the effective pre-
vention of accidental pollution in factories.3 02 At a ministerial conference
on Rhine pollution on December 19, 1986, Swiss President Alfons Egli
told a special session of the Swiss Parliament that his government will
take "radical measures" to ensure that another disaster like the Sandoz
fire does not occur again.0 4 On December 18, 1986, cradle-to-grave legis-
lation was introduced in the Canadian House of Commons, the primary
focus of which was on preventive aspects.30 5
3. United States
The United States approach, while primarily that of an exporting
296. See id. at 21.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 20.
299. Extension of SEVESO, Oil Spill Legislation to Non-EEC Countries Discussed by
Ministers, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 443 (Dec. 10, 1986).
300. Even Tighter Pollution Regulations Announced in Wake of SANDOZ Incident, 9
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 438 (Dec. 10, 1986).
301. Id.
302. French Require 'Isolation Zone' Around Factories to Reduce Amount of Risk, 10
Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 16 (Jan. 14, 1987).
303. Government Bills Switzerland $38 Million, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 3 (Jan. 14,
1987).
304. 'Radical Measures', 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 429 (Dec. 10, 1986).
305. See 10 Int'l Env. & Rep. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 14, 1987).
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country, has also been shaped by the events at the sister plant to Bhopal
in Institute, West Virginia. Evaluations and studies, like the one under-
taken by the Environmental Protection Agency, looked at possible gaps
in the environmental statutes to determine whether statutory changes
were needed in order to prevent chemical plant accidents similar to Bho-
pal from happening."0 6 Legislation also was introduced which would have
brought increased pressure upon the EPA to strengthen its efforts in
chemical safety enforcement.
The United States, as an exporter of technology and products, has in
place legislation which provides the basis for the regulation of the export
of hazardous technologies or products. In the past, the Export Adminis-
tration Act (EAA) has been the vehicle for attempts to control sensitive
exports. 307 Certainly, the EAA has been used by the U.S. government to
prohibit the export of technologies it considered to be sensitive with re-
gard to more traditional foreign policy concerns. In its reenactment in
1985, control of hazardous exports was deemed to be a policy suitable for
inclusion with the other traditional concerns.08 Some have also argued
that the National Environmental Policy Act'0 9 could also be the basis for
U.S. regulation of exports. The most directly applicable legislation has
been the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,3 0 which
contains both domestic registration and export notification provisions
with regard to the export of pesticides.
The policy assumptions which underlie these latter provisions, from
the exporting country perspective, are three-fold. First, the notification is
a part of the general principle of comity between states, in that it is good
practice to alert the recipient country to risks that have been identified
by the exporting country with regard to the technology or process in
question. Furthermore, notification is assumed to be sufficient to allow
the identification of all the risks present and that this identification will
result in a valid analysis of those risks, as well as the benefits, by the
recipient country.
The Bhopal tragedy, however, brings into sharp focus the questions
regarding the propriety of allowing tort litigation in U.S. courts, " ' if a
U.S. based multinational enterprise controlled a foreign business and op-
306. Task Force Studies Adequacy of U.S. Laws to Prevent Chemical Accidents Like
Bhopal, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 33 (Feb. 13, 1985).
307. 50 U.S.C. App. §§2401-2420.
308. See Pub. L. No. 99-64, 99 Stat. 120, 121, § 3(13) (July 12, 1985).
309. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61.
310. 7 U.S.C. § 136. For proposed legislation under which regulations on the export of
hazardous substances would have been further strengthened, see H.R. 638, introduced by
Congressman Michael Barnes, Jan. 22, 1985, 99th Congress, CONG. REC., at 28, 186; H.R.
1703, introduced by Congressmen Bonker and Solarz, March 25, 1985, 99th Congress,
CONG. REC., at 28, 245.
311. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
601 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983), lends support to granting access to U.S. courts for Bhopal
plaintiffs.
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erated it under conditions deficient by standards generally applicable in
the United States. This approach would operate on a different set of pol-
icy assumptions from those delineated for the existing legislation by pro-
jecting the standards prevalent in the United States outside of the U.S.
borders. Such a projection of standards assumes that there can and
should be a single standard of operation, regardless of the context, and
that the United States, at least for its own multinationals, is the appro-
priate source for that standard.
Finally, notwithstanding a problem with defining "control" 31" to de-
termine access to U.S. courts, enough case law exists in the United States
to make a determination for jurisdictional purposes in the antitrust and
securities fields, i.e., whether a parent-subsidiary relationship warrants
the exercise of jurisdiction in the United States. A similar determination
could be made were such legislation adopted pertaining to jurisdiction for
tort legislation.
4. Developing Countries
Following the Chernobyl accident, the People's Republic of China
promulgated in October 1986 regulations on safety supervision and con-
trol of civilian nuclear installations. 13 The regulations set up a regime of
licensing and control of such installations and establish a National Nu-
clear Safety Administration whose task is to centralize supervision of the
safety of such installations nationally.
Generally, developing countries tend to be recipient countries for the
purpose of the transfer of hazardous technology and products. In the pre-
Bhopal context, this meant that the responsibility for the protection of
the peoples and the environments in developing countries has also rested
with the governments of those countries. At the time of the Stockholm
conference in 1972, there was widespread concern among developing
countries that the perceived imposition by developed countries of envi-
ronmental regulations and safeguards was a new way of making a claim
on the limited productive resources available to developing countries.3"
This new claim was seen as an obstacle to the future rate of development
in these countries. There was also a fear that the more stringent environ-
mental regulations being implemented in the developed countries would
limit the export potential for raw materials and products produced by the
developing countries. Finally, there was also a general concern among de-
veloping countries that they would be expected to bear the increased
costs associated with the more stringent environmental regulations with-
312. For a discussion of theories of direct liability for Union Carbide, U.S.A., see West-
brook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for International Settle-
ment, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 32 (1985).
313. See 39 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 9 (June 1987).
314. See, e.g., [Founex report] UNCTAD, Development and Environment, Report and
Working Papers of a Panel of Experts (Founex) (Mouton 1972); Defries, supra note 107.
VOL. 17:1
EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE AND TECHNOLOGY
out having the financial capability to take full advantage of the new op-
portunities that would arise from the development of environmental con-
trol processes.
This initial resistance to incorporating environmental concerns into
development plans, when combined with the general enthusiasm with
which developing countries courted foreign capital and industrial
projects, contributed to the Bhopal accident and, to a slightly lesser ex-
tent, the Seveso accident. Countries such as India and Italy were eager to
increase their level of industrialization. Special favors in the form of tax
breaks or concessions on utility costs were often granted to encourage
companies to establish plants in the granting country.
Those mechanisms which did exist that would allow the recipient
country to exercise some control over the environmental consequences of
the proposed installation or project were often ignored or poorly imple-
mented. In India, zoning codes and development plans did exist for many
Indian cities. However, enforcement and implementation were often less
than adequate. Furthermore, countries that were encouraging new invest-
ment often did not have stringent health and environmental regulations.
As noted earlier, Italy did not formulate any legislation specifically ad-
dressing environmental issues until after the Seveso accident, and, even
then, it did so in an indirect manner.
Recipient countries were often likely to lack trained personnel who
had the skills to run a major industrial installation safely. Once a plant
was built, the surrounding communities were often not instructed as to
the proper procedures in the case of an accident, as occurred at Seveso
and Bhopal.
The new guidelines and legislation which have been formulated as a
result of these tragedies generally do not shift the burden of responsibil-
ity away from the recipient countries. Under the notification require-
ments, the country receiving the technology or product is still to carry out
the analysis of the information received in order to make a determination
of possible environmental effects. Where a recipient country lacks the
skilled personnel or the funding to adequately analyze such data, the end
result may be no different than if no notification had occurred at all.
D. Nongovernmental Organizations
Efforts by nongovernmental organizations to shape and generate
public support for guidelines or standards in the area of the transfer of
hazardous technology have primarily taken place since the Bhopal acci-
dent. In early 1985, the Conservation Foundation announced an agree-
ment on voluntary guidelines for labeling pesticides exported to develop-
ing countries.3 1 5 In Europe, a coalition seeking controls on exports of
315. Guides on Labeling Exported Pesticides, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 124 (Oct. 9,
1985).
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dangerous products to developing countries was formed by consumer and
environmental groups.31 6 The World Resources Institute has also added
its voice to the calls for an increased awareness of the relationship be-
tween development, population, and environmental problems. 317 Follow-
ing the Chernobyl and Basel accidents, several nongovernmental groups
in Europe sought concerted international action to cope with the threats
to the environment caused by such accidents. 8
E. Multinational Corporations
The attitudes toward corporate responsibility for the transfer of haz-
ardous technologies have shifted considerably as a result of the Seveso,
Bhopal, and Basel disasters. While, in the case of Union Carbide, there
has been no complete acceptance of legal responsibility to date, the set-
tlement negotiations have certainly implied that acceptance by the com-
pany.3 19 In the cases of Seveso and Basel, that acceptance of liability took
place early on.
The major shift has been in the increasingly sharp focus upon the
design and operating procedures for major industrial installations. Sev-
eral reports analyzing the Bhopal accident indicated that the disaster was
caused by insufficient attention to safety in the process design, dangerous
operating procedures, lack of proper maintenance, faulty equipment, and
major costs in manning levels, crew sizes, and skilled supervision.1 This
sharpening of focus has highlighted the general absence of corporate poli-
cies on environment and resource management. Such policies would ad-
dress issues of workplace hazards, industrial accidents, marketing of haz-
ardous products and relations with the recipient country's environment
and natural resource officials.3"'
To illustrate, the Sandoz group established an internal working group
which redefined safety rules regarding the storage of toxic and flammable
substances.32 2 The group's specific recommendations related to specifica-
tions and equipment of storage buildings, storage density, volume and
technique, packaging and storage records; and retention of water used for
fire-fighting in case of fire. 2 ' The European Council of Chemical Manu-
316. Coalition Seeks 'Meaningful Controls', 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 339 (Oct. 9,
1985).
317. New Political Agenda on Environment, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 12 (Jan. 8, 1986).
318. Counter Conference Planned, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 288 (Aug. 13, 1986).
319. See, e.g., Unions Say Heeding Employee's Warnings Could Have Prevented Acci-
dent at Bhopal, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 308 (1985).
320. See, e.g., the statement by the vice-president of Dow Chemical Canada Inc., that
better management practices were the key to preventing tragedies such as Bhopal. Quoted
in Better Management Policies, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 232 (July 10, 1985).
321. SANDOZ Working Group Produces Report, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 4 (Jan. 14,
1987).
322. Id.
323. European Chemical Manufacturers Agree on Guidelines, 10 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 329 (Nov. 11, 1987).
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facturers Federation prepared guidelines in May 1987 which are based on
the premise that the chemicals industry "has a duty to satisfy itself that
its products are manufactured, handled, transported, used, and disposed
of safely and without unacceptable risk to the environment and that it
should not only comply with the law, but also take independent and re-
sponsible actions."
Increased emphasis on changes in corporate policies, however, has
not been without resistance, as the Business and Industry Advisory Com-
mittee objected to guidelines proposed by the OECD's Environment
Committee which called upon multinational corporations to consider en-
vironmental protection and environmentally related health problems and
to cooperate with local authorities by providing information and assis-
tance.3 4 Similarly, resistance by the chemical industry to the proposed
more stringent regulations by the EEC in 1986 regarding the export of
banned or severely restricted chemicals was quite vocal. s25
VI. APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. General
The preceding survey highlights the need for further action on all
levels - multilateral, bilateral, and national. It is only in the aftermath
of these tragic occurrences that safety issues pertaining to the export of
hazardous substances and technology and nuclear power plants have re-
ceived special attention both nationally and internationally. How to
translate the enhanced worldwide concern with and awareness of these
issues326 into concrete measures is the next challenge. Specifically, the
need is to develop further the existing principles of international environ-
mental law and to clarify the roles and obligations of international orga-
nizations, exporting countries, recipient countries, and multinational
enterprises.
B. International Legal Norms and International Standards
It is high time that selected developing norms of international envi-
ronmental law, such as the principles of timely notification, information
324. Guidelines for Multinationals, Environment Rejected, 8 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA)
186 (June 12, 1985).
325. See CEFIC Official says Export Proposal Could Hurt Industry's Competitiveness,
9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 391-92 (Nov. 12, 1986); see also Making Company Disasters Less
Disastrous, THE EcoNOMIST, Jan. 31, 1987, at 55, col. 1.
326. According to a recent EEC poll, released on December 4, 1986, 59 percent of the
respondents named chemical plants as the pollution source worrying them most. Comment-
ing on the poll, the EEC Environmental Affairs Commissioner said at a news conference
that "[plublic awareness of and concern about environmental issues continues to grow. This
poll confirms public uneasiness about environmental issues and the failure of public authori-
ties to deal effectively with the threats to our environment." Chemical Pollution Top Public
Concern, 9 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 441 (Dec. 12, 1986).
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exchange, and consultation, on which a broad consensus already exists, be
enshrined in a general convention on environmental protection. The Con-
vention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 2 7 which entered into
force on October 27, 1986, represents a step in this direction, with its
requirement that states promptly publicize any information concerning
nuclear accidents in order to minimize the transboundary impacts of such
an accident. 28 Similarly, the need is to develop and clarify the obligation
of a state causing transboundary harm to grant affected persons equal
access and equal treatment to administrative and judicial proceedings.
92
9
Also, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration as dispute settlement mech-
anisms need to be refined and encouraged.330
A promising development in this area is the work of the World Com-
mission on Environment and Development, which in August 1986 re-
ceived a report from an expert's group on legal principles on environmen-
tal protection and sustainable development which should be in place by
the year 2000.31' Beginning with article 1 which recognizes the "funda-
mental right to all human beings to an environment adequate for their
health and well-being," ' the group recommended a set of 22 articles to
constitute a framework for global cooperation on both preventive and re-
medial aspects.33
The recent activities of the UNEP,3 4 the EEC,3 5 the OECD,'3 6 and
other regional groups3 3 7 as well as states3 and multinational enter-
prises339 are indeed responsive to the growing need, especially of the re-
cipient countries. Even further emphasis on anticipatory and preventive
aspects is needed.
327. Reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1370 (1986).
328. Id. art. 2.
329. For an OECD recommendation on the subject, see Recommendation of the Coun-
cil for Implementation of Regime of Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in
Relation to Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Doc. C.(77) 28 (Final 1977).
330. For reports on recent programs in this area, see generally Anderson, Negotiation
and Informal Agency Action, 1985 DuKE L.J. 261; Patton, Settling Environmental Dis-
putes: The Experience with and Future of Environmental Mediation, 14 ENVTL. L. 547
(1984); and Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts, 10
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1985).
331. See Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal
Principles and Recommendations (R.D. Munro and J.G. Lammers, eds. 1987).
332. OCED Gets Report From Experts Group on International Law, 9 Int'l Env't Rep.
(BNA) 417 (Nov. 11, 1986).
333. See id. at 417-18; see also Shabecoff, Pollution Study: The Economic Link, N.Y.
Times, April, 27, 1987, at 1, col.1.
334. See supra § V(B)(3).
335. See supra § V(B)(2).
336. Id. § V(B)(1).
337. Regional groups such as the Organization of American States have only recently
begun to take initiatives in this area.
338. See supra at § V(C).
339. See supra § V(E);
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While the notion of state responsibility concerning issues such as
transboundary pollution is receiving considerable attention,4 0 it is also
appropriate to consider the issue of state responsibility with regard to
transfers of dangerous technology and hazardous wastes. An examination
of the examples discussed earlier in this article will reveal the difficulty in
applying the concept to this area: most of the transfers were between pri-
vate parties rather than states, with the role of the state being merely
regulatory.3 " '
Traditionally, state responsibility has been used as a means for im-
posing reparations upon a state that has caused damage to parties
abroad.""2 However, in the case of the type of accidents considered here,
monetary damages are poor compensation for possibly permanent damage
to the environment. Thus, imposition of state responsibility may also be
said to have a second purpose, which would be to encourage nations to
enact and enforce environmental standards that would prevent such acci-
dents from occurring. s Therefore, even though a state may not be a
party to a transaction that brings a dangerous technology within its bor-
ders, it can be said to have an obligation to regulate that technology so
that it does not cause harm.3 "
This also raises the question whether a nation which exports such
technology may also bear responsibility, even though it is not a party to
the transaction. A state that allows careless export of a hazardous tech-
nology would probably have to share responsibility with a state that al-
lows careless imports of technology. However, it is not always the mere
export of the technology that is the cause of such accidents: there may be
such issues as careless supervision and failure to enforce local laws or
company regulations.3 "5 It would also seem that the preventative purpose
of the doctrine of state responsibility would not be well served by in ef-
340. See generally Magraw, Transboundary Harm: The International Law Commis-
sion's Study of 'International Liability, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1986); Nanda, The Estab-
lishment of International Standards for Transnational Environmental Injury, 60 IOwA L.
REV. 1089 (1979); Williatms, Public International Law Governing Transboundary Pollution,
13 U. QUEENSLAND L. J. 112 (1984); International Liability for Nuclear Pollution, 11 SuFF.
TRANSNAT'L L. J. 75 (1987); Goldie, Transfrontier Pollution - From Concepts of Liability
to Administrative Conciliation, 12 SYR. J. INT'L L. & Com. 185 (1985); International Pollu-
tion: The Struggle Between States and Scholars Over Customary Environmental Norms:
The Hazy View After Chernobyl and Basel, 12 S. ILL. U. L. J. 247 (1987); see also supra
notes 20-21 (on a proposed convention controlling transboundary shipments of hazardous
waste).
341. But see, Handl, State Responsibility for Accidental Transnational Environmen-
tal Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1980).
342. See Williams, supra note 340, at 115; Report of the International Law Commis-
sion on the Work of Its 39th Session, 42 U.N. GAOR, supp. (No, 10) at 89, U.N. Doc. A/42/
10 (1987)[hereinafter cited as ILC Rep.].
343. See Magraw, supra note 340, at 326; ILC Rep, supra note 343, at 108-110.
344. See, e.g., Report of the U. N. Conference on the Human Environment, supra note
24.
345. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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fect relieving the importing nation of the financial responsibility for any
future accident by holding the exporting state liable for compensation.
However, by relieving the exporting state of all responsibility, there may
indeed be serious difficulties for innocent victims seeking compensation
for injuries and other losses.
Keeping the above difficulties in mind, it is appropriate to now in-
quire into alternate theories of liability. While several theories have been
suggested by commentators, two will be discussed here. 4" A fault basis of
liability would allow liability to be imposed when a state breaches an obli-
gation, causing an injury to a party in another state.347 Strict liability
would impose liability for acts or omissions that cause injuries in another
territory even if applicable standards of care were maintained.348 The ra-
tionale of strict liability is to make such injuries part of the cost of the
enterprise. 49 In effect, it would be because a state is gaining a benefit
from the existence of the enterprise (taxes, employment, experts, etc.)
that it should also have to bear the risk of loss vis-a-vis an innocent third
party. In a purely domestic situation, it would also be justified on a the-
ory of loss-spreading - a corporation could pass on the added costs (of
insurance, judgments) throughout the society by increasing the price of
its products. Since society benefits from the products, society as a whole
should bear the cost of the risk, rather than the innocent injured individ-
ual."' Even though the company may be "innocent," i.e., not at fault,
since it can better spread the loss, it would be liable. This loss-spreading
rationale may not be directly applicable to states in the case of an acci-
dent that causes harm in another country, since, theoretically, the loss
would not be spread in the country where the loss occurred. However, the
theory of enterprise liability would still be applicable, since the society
that benefits from the enterprise by profiting from the export would be
liable for risks caused by it.
It should be noted that the imposition of state responsibility would
not exonerate the private companies that may be responsible for the acci-
dent.3"' Injured parties may also choose to seek a judgment against these
companies; however, in many cases there may be difficulties, such as ac-
cess to the courts of a foreign nation, etc.352 Even if a state is held respon-
sible and pays compensation, it would still be able to demand compensa-
tion from the company." 3
346. Additional theories would include subjective fault criteria (see Williams, supra
note 340, at 116) and absolute liability (id. at 117-18; Goldie, supra note 340, at 195-98;
Magraw, supra note 340, at 327).
347. See Magraw, supra note 340, at 316-19.
348. See id.; ILC Rep., supra note 342, at 111-13; Goldie, supra note 341, at 190.
349. See Goldie, supra note 340, at 190.
350. See id. at 193.
351. See ILC Rep., supra note 342, at 110-11.
352. See id. at 111.
353. See id.
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There is as yet no consensus on whether any of these theories of lia-
bility has already been accepted as customary. The recent discussions of
the International Law Commission concerning International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by Interna-
tional Law reflect a diversity of views on the subject.3 54 Some representa-
tives felt that strict liability was not presently accepted in international
law,"5' while others did.3 56 The Special Rapporteur defended the inclusion
of the concept as it was necessary to provide compensation, and he also
asserted that strict liability would not necessarily be inconsistent with the
preventive purpose of the topic. 57 He also suggested that, to accomplish
these purposes, the concept of strict liability might be modified from the
concept used in domestic legal systems and in some international
conventions.' 58
If some obligation is to be the underlying basis of state responsibility
concerning accidents involving dangerous technology and hazardous
wastes, the nature of the obligation must be explored further. Principle
21 of the 1972 Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment could be the basis of an obligation to regulate adequately activi-
ties within a nation's borders so as not to harm the environment of other
nations. 5s In the case of export of hazardous waste, this principle could
be clearly construed to impose an obligation on the exporting nation,
since the activity that produced the waste took place there. In most cases,
if such a nation has no adequate way for disposing of the waste, as a
producer of the waste, it should be responsible for the consequences. 6
However, the export of hazardous technology may not easily fit
within this framework. Instead, certain other obligations may be said to
fall upon exporting nations. The exporting nation may be responsible for
ensuring that appropriate information is disclosed to the importing na-
tion regarding the potential hazards posed by the technology.36 1 Further,
it may also be required to ensure that adequate designs and safeguards
are furnished to the importing nations regarding hazardous installa-
tions.3 2 The breach of these obligations might give rise to state responsi-
bility of the exporting nation if the damage were caused by such an
omission.
Presently, the International Law Commission is engaged in the study
354. See id. at 89-115.
355. See id. at 111-112.
356. See id. at 112, citing Trail Smelter arbitration, (U.S. v. Can.) 3 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 1905 (1938 and 1941); and Gut Dam Claims, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 118 (1980).
357. See id. at 113.
358. See id.
359. See note 24 supra.
360. The U.S. has recently considered such an obligation; see U.S. Would Tie Waste
Exports to Bilateral Agreements, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 472 (Sept. 14,1988).
361. Such as decision was passed recently by the OECD Governing Council, Hazardous
Installation Measures Adopted, 11 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 465 (Sept. 14, 1988).
362. See id.
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of a workable regime concerning the topic of state responsibility."' s While
the debate thus far indicates that there are widely divergent views on
some issues, the necessity of reaching a consensus in the area seems
widely understood. Concepts such as "knowledge" and "foreseeability"
may also be important in allaying the fears some nations have of ex-
panded liability.'" Once concepts become clearer in their application to
simpler cases, a better evaluation of state responsibility regarding the ex-
port of hazardous technology can then be made. For the time being,
awareness of the issues involved, as well as genuine concern for the pro-
tection of the environment, are the essential first steps. The next task is
to have in place appropriate domestic and regional legislation, as well as
responsible and restrained actions on the part of multinational
enterprises.
C. The Role of the Main Actors
Problems are likely to be accentuated, especially for developing
states,3 65 in the absence of a systematic information-sharing system. Gen-
erally, as recipient countries of hazardous products or technology, they
have to rely on foreign test data, due to the fact that many of them lack
the capability and wherewithal to conduct adequate risk analysis and,
therefore, are unable to make intelligent choices about appropriate tech-
nology and products. Also, many developing states lack adequate environ-
mental laws and regulations s6 and even those in place are inconsistently
applied and implemented.
3 7
As discussed earlier, it may be necessary for exporting countries to
apply their own laws, such as export control mechanisms, s to assist in a
worldwide effort to prevent harm from hazardous substances and technol-
ogy. It may be that the application of more stringent standards of export-
ing countries should apply to such exports even when the recipient state
with its lax standards would welcome a hazardous substance or technol-
ogy. Also, both developed countries and international organizations can
play a useful role in providing recipient countries with the technical assis-
tance which they sorely need. It is equally important that multinational
enterprises act in a responsible fashion.
363. See ILC Rep., supra note 342. For a report on the earlier work of the International
Law Commission regarding environmental law and state responsibility, see generally McCaf-
frey, An Update on the Contributions of the International Law Commission to Interna-
tional Environmental Law Relating to the Environment, 11 ECOLOGY L. Q. 189 (1983).
364. See ILC Rep., supra note 342, at 93-94.
365. See supra § III(C)(4).
366. See, e.g., Nanda, The Development of U.S. Environmental Law: Some Lessons for
Other Nations (Paper presented at Conference on Common Law in Asia, University of Hong
Kong, Dec. 15-17, 1986, a copy of which is on file with the DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'v).
367. See id.
368. See supra § III(C)(3).
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VII. CONCLUSION
It is perhaps useful to recall that the modern environmental move-
ment is of rather recent origin and can be traced to the 1960s when
Rachel Carson' Silent Spring"6 9 and Garret Hardin's The Tragedy of the
Commons1 0 enhanced public awareness on environmental issues. Seveso,
Bhopal, Chernobyl, and Basel have shocked the world community into
paying special attention to issues concerning the export of hazardous sub-
stances and technologies. Thus, at a recent world conference on chemical
accidents, there
emerged a sense of the all-too-real potential for industrial accidents;
the need for emergency preparedness and response efforts that are re-
alistic and multidisciplinary; the necessity of involving government,
industry, and the public in the planning process; the gaps in informa-
tion on health and safety effects of chemicals; the importance of pre-
ventive measures; and the need for international cooperation and co-
ordination in response planning and in notification given other
countries.3 17
Similarly, the dumping of hazardous wastes abroad is a matter of in-
ternational concern. As noted earlier,37 pertinent forms of international
environmental law are still in a developing stage. Although these norms
are not at present considered obligatory as "hard" law upon states, inter-
national organizations and multinational enterprises, they provide useful
guidelines for the activities of these actors. Also, even if these norms are
deemed as "soft" law, they nonetheless reflect a growing trend.
Such developing norms relate to state responsibility," 3 and also in-
clude the obligation to exchange information and to notify and consult in
a timely fashion;3 1 ' the imposition of strict liability for the harm caused
by the export of hazardous waste or technology; 75 and the imposition of
liability to compensate the victims.3 7 To prevent further Bhopals there is
urgency for the formulation of enforceable international legal standards
which are applicable to the export of hazardous technologies. Similar
standards are needed to apply to the export of hazardous waste. As the
cases studied here show, the problem is serious. Until recently, however,
the gravity of the challenge was not universally recognized. Now that it is
acknowledged that these cases may simply be the tip of the iceberg, much
more needs to be done in taking both preventive and remedial measures.
369. R. CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
370. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
371. World Conference on Chemical Accidents Reflects Concern over Recent Disasters,
Highlights Need for Planning, Cooperation, 10 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 407 (Aug. 12, 1987).
372. See supra §§ III, V(A), VI(B.).
373. See supra notes 33-38, 340-364, and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 202.
375. See supra notes 348-350 and accompanying text.
376. See Rosencranz, Bhopal, Transnational Corporations, and Hazardous Technolo-
gies, 17 AMBio 336, 336-337 (1988).
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The problem needs to be addressed urgently and promptly. Appro-
priately, the enhanced awareness that only concerted global efforts can
succeed is now being translated into specific measures by UNEP, regional
organizations such as OECD and EEC, and national legislation. The
world community has no choice but to find effective measures at the
global, regional, bilateral and national levels to meet this challenge.
